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Chapter 1
Introduction
Pursuing a low inflation policy in an environment of open capital accounts and flex-
ible exchange rates is a basic strategy that is widely adopted by industrialized and
emerging economies. The general appeal of this framework can be summarized by
few basic arguments. Namely, the fact that so many economies aim to keep their
inflation rates low and stable reflects the view that economic growth and stability can
be achieved more easily in this environment. Openness of capital accounts is regarded
as indispensable since it promises significant welfare gains from improved capital allo-
cation. Lastly, policymakers prefer free floating exchange rates to alternative policies
of imperfect flexibility to be better able to pursue a domestic monetary policy under
globalized capital markets.1 While the empirical investigation of such claims has im-
portant implications for the most fundamental decisions of monetary policy, extant
studies suffer from several conceptual shortcomings that might complicate straightfor-
ward conclusions. The goal of this work is to reinvestigate the aforementioned claims
from an empirical point of view, taking into account associated pitfalls in related re-
search. In the following four main chapters, each issue will be addressed separately.
The interrelationship between inflation, inflation uncertainty, economic growth and
stability will be studied in Chapter 2, the current state of capital market integration
in Chapter 3 and monetary independence in Chapter 4 and 5. Chapter 3 corresponds
to the article of Herwartz and Roestel (2011) as published by John Wiley and Sons.
Chapter 5 is the article of Herwartz and Roestel (2009) as published by De Gruyter.
Subsequently, I will discuss each issue in more detail and illustrate in which respect
existing empirical studies might give rise to misleading conclusions. By reference to
this literature, I will highlight the contribution of this work and summarize the results.
1Apart from the benefit of monetary independence, a flexible foreign exchange rate further offers the
opportunity to reestablish cross country competitiveness in presence of sticky prices and wages
at low cost. In this study, I will concentrate on the aspect of monetary independence, while the
aforementioned issue of exchange rate pass through will be addressed in future research.
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The view that inflation and inflation uncertainty tend to impair economic growth
and stability will be empirically confirmed in Chapter 2. For this purpose, the joint
interrelationship between inflation, output growth and respective uncertainties will be
estimated and discussed for 34 developed and emerging economies. Policymakers are
reluctant to accept higher inflation since this potentially triggers inflation uncertainty,
which might incur costs in terms of output uncertainty and lower economic growth.
However, the financial crisis has initiated a general reconsideration of the paradigm
of low inflation policies. Nowadays, increasingly many economists suggest to raise
inflation levels moderately, stressing that this might increase the power of the interest
rate instrument. For instance, Blanchard et al. (2010) advocates that inflation tar-
geting strategies should be modified in the sense that inflation expectations are well
anchored, but on a moderate level, 4%, say. In this context, the potential economic
costs of such a policy are often condensed to be negligible. However, several assump-
tions underlie such arguments. Namely, that i) one may separate inflation levels and
inflation uncertainty, ii) inflation uncertainty rather than inflation is detrimental to
growth iii) inflation and/or inflation uncertainty does not trigger output volatility, or,
alternatively, iv) output volatility is at least not harmful to output growth. For such
questions, it is of importance to understand the joint interaction of inflation, its uncer-
tainty, economic growth and stability that tends to prevail in modern-world economies
with low to moderate inflation rates. However, studies that assess these joint interre-
lationships such as Grier and Perry (2000), Fountas and Karanasos (2007) or Bredin
and Fountas (2009) often provide conflicting evidence over distinct economies, while
relying on quite historic data sets. These tend to comprise information obtained dur-
ing the eras of bretton woods, oil crises and the great moderation, raising the question
if such information is useful for current policy issues. In contrast, we will assess the
simultaneous interaction between inflation, inflation uncertainty, output growth and
volatility for 34 economies during the current era of low inflation policies. Obviously,
this requires the estimation of large scale econometric models under use of very short
sampling periods. However, we will argue that selective inference is possible in the
framework of mean group estimation. After introducing the econometric methodology
we will discuss the empirical findings derived from cross sectional features of country
specific transmission parameter estimates. Thereby, we will put a particular effort on
highlighting the role of monetary performance, providing characteristic transmission
patterns for economies with low, moderate and higher inflation rates. One main in-
sight of the analysis is that both inflation and inflation uncertainty tend to reduce
output growth for the vast majority of investigated economies and, moreover, this
2
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link cannot be rejected to be equally strong in economies with low, intermediate and
higher inflation rates. Hence, it is unlikely that one could target inflation rates at
intermediate levels (rather than at low levels) at no cost, and hence, keeping inflation
rates low and stable is an attractive policy option.
Turning to the the argument that open capital accounts give rise to investment
allocation efficiency gains, Chapter 3 provides empirical evidence that capital market
integration has likely prevailed for a subset of G7 countries during the most recent
decade. The vast majority of economies are reluctant to impose barriers to interna-
tional capital flows despite the fact that they have been severely affected by interna-
tional financial turmoils during the past two decades. This shows that economists still
agree on the overall benefit of capital market openness. Recent studies such as Laeven
(2003), Galindo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (2007) or Abiad, Oomes and Ueda (2007)
suggest that capital market openness is accompanied by higher investment alloca-
tion efficiency, smoothes consumption growth (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 2006)
and fosters economic activity (Rousseau 2003, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 2005,
Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel 2007).2 To some extent, however, all of these
benefits reflect a consequence of higher investment allocation efficiency. The most
direct approaches to test for capital allocation efficiency are based on the law of one
price, which implies that capital can be raised at equal global cost. An intuitive way
to diagnose this form of efficiency is to test for the convergence of international real
interest rates.3 In presence of integrated world markets, both the return on physical
and financial assets should tend to converge across economies. While this proposition
has received considerable attention in the empirical literature, evidence for full conver-
gence among international real interest rates is rather mixed. I will argue that extant
studies are subject to particular deficiencies of real interest rate measurement which
do not apply in case that capital market real interest rates are measured by means
of long term inflation indexed interest rates. Considering the most recent decade, we
will test if capital can be raised at equal cost for a subset of the G7 economies, fo-
cussing on the real cost of long term external capital obtained from inflation indexed
government bonds. After providing a brief discussion on the economic theory and
the considered hypotheses we will discuss the methodologies that we use to infer on
real interest rate convergence properties. Then, we will present the empirical results
2In contrast, Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003) document a negative impact on growth.
3This concept does not rely on potentially misspecified asset pricing models commonly used in
international finance. Here, asset pricing models are used to uncover if the cost of equity capital
is determined with respect to global or local risks (see e.g. Bekaert and Harvey 1995, Hardouvelis
et al. 2006, Carrieri, Errunza and Hogan 2009).
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that suggest complete long run convergence of real interest rates. In addition, we
will provide empirical evidence suggesting that particular deficiencies of real interest
rate measurement could give rise to a spurious rejection of capital market integration.
We conclude that international capital markets are integrated nowadays, and hence,
maintaining open capital accounts is a beneficial policy option.
Supporting the view that flexible exchange rates give rise to a higher degree of
monetary independence compared to less flexible arrangements, Chapter 4 provides
an analysis of domestic interest rate dependence under distinct degrees of exchange
rate flexibility. According to Mundell (1963), monetary authorities should be able
to pursue an independent monetary policy in presence of open capital accounts if
spot exchange rates are allowed to move freely. Hence, small economies are only able
to follow monetary strategies such as inflation targeting if they accept some expo-
sure to exchange rate volatility and, hence, a potential impediment for cross border
trade and investment. The main points in Mundell (1963) are summarized in the
’macroeconomic trilemma’ (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor 2005). Namely, that
only two among the following three fundamental aims of monetary policy can be
achieved jointly: Capital account openness, fixed exchange rates and monetary inde-
pendence. Firstly, an economy with an open capital account and pegged exchange
rates cannot conduct an independent monetary policy. Its central bank would have
to react to the prevalence of excess supply/demand for local currency whenever inter-
national investors are not indifferent on the cross country interest rate spreads that
emerge in the conduct of domestic monetary policy. Such interventions on foreign
exchange rate markets, however, give rise to balance-of-payments-induced changes in
the money supply that tend to offset the initial interest rate manipulation. Therefore,
under pegged exchange rates and open capital markets, the money supply and the
interest rate are no longer available means of a proactive domestic monetary policy.
Secondly, small open economies can only set domestic interest rates independently
from foreign ones if the price of the domestic currency is flexible enough to reestab-
lish the indifference of investors on the resulting cross country nominal interest rate
spreads. Lastly, an economy that intends to pursue a domestic monetary policy under
fixed exchange rates cannot allow for open capital accounts. Interest rates and ex-
change rates can only be chosen independently from each other if international capital
is immobile. Noting that, in general, policymakers are reluctant to accept high ex-
change rate volatility, one might be interested in the question if flexibility of exchange
rates must be perfect to guarantee a sufficient degree of monetary independence. For
instance, if monetary authorities only allow for graduate adjustments, linkages among
4
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interest rates might be sufficiently weak to establish the possibility to address domes-
tic goals at least temporarily. Hence, apart from extreme cases such as free floating
or fixed exchange rates, the macroeconomic trilemma in fact suggests a continuous
tradeoff among interest rate independence and exchange rate stability. In this respect,
existing studies only provide limited insights as they tend to refer to highly stylized
classifications of FX rate flexibility. To evaluate the argument if floating exchange
rates allow for a higher independence of monetary policy than less flexible arrange-
ments, I assess the macroeconomic trilemma as generally and flexibly as possible by
considering interest rate dependence as a nonlinear function of exchange rate variabil-
ity and capital mobility. This issue is analyzed in a semiparametric panel framework
with functional coefficients (Cai, Fan and Yao 2000, Herwartz and Xu 2009). Empir-
ical evidence suggests that nominal interest rate linkages tend to increase gradually
with exchange rate stability and capital market openness, while perfect FX flexibility
does not appear indispensable for some degree of monetary independence. Formally
testing the implications of the macroeconomic trilemma, I strongly reject invariance
of interest rate transmission with respect to capital mobility and FX rate flexibility.
After a further motivation, we will introduce the empirical model, which is estimated
by means of both conventional and semiparametric panel techniques. Furthermore,
the employed state variables for measuring exchange rate flexibility and capital mo-
bility are introduced and motivated. Subsequently, we will present and discuss the
empirical results suggesting that flexible exchange rates give rise to a higher degree
of monetary independence as compared to less flexible arrangements.
In Chapter 5, we will provide an alternative empirical assessment of monetary de-
pendence under flexible exchange rates for a subset of G7 economies, namely Canada,
France (assumed to represent the EMU), the UK and the US. Rather than estimating
the comovements of short term variables such as short term nominal interest rates or
inflation rates, I consider the empirical dependence of ex-ante long run inflation rates.
These are measured in terms of international breakeven inflation rates. Proceeding
this way one may avoid common pitfalls related to the measurement of independence
by means of comovements among short term interest or inflation rates as in Eun and
Jeong (1999), Yang et al. (2006), Frankel et al. (2004) or Obstfeld et al. (2005). These
are related to the fact that nominal comovements might reflect central banks to inde-
pendently choose a similar stance of monetary policy when facing common shocks or
synchronized business cycles. Given that ten year ahead inflation compensation should
predominantly reflect expectations regarding long run monetary policy, it is unlikely
that such spurious patterns of dependence dominate nominal linkages observed across
5
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countries. I analyze nominal linkages both in terms of testing Granger causality in
the framework of a VAR model and in terms of contemporaneous correlation which is
interpreted to reflect both common shocks and nominal linkage. I find that in particu-
lar long run inflation prospects in Canada vary with expectations concerning long run
US inflation, thereby failing to fully reflect the domestic inflation target. Similarly,
also inflation expectations in the Euro area and the UK are subjected to common
shocks, but empirical correlations vary on a lower scale. Thus, in comparison with
the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England is likely better able to target domestic long
run inflation. More specifically, empirical findings suggest that Canadian and US rate
correlations are relatively high if i) the US conducts an expansionary monetary pol-
icy, ii) US inflation uncertainty is high or iii) if the Canadian-US exchange rate rate
volatility is low. Similarly, UK and EMU linkage appears to increase if (long term)
inflation expectations in the Euro area become relatively uncertain. Nominal linkage
between the UK and the US rises in response to US inflation uncertainty and volatile
UK FX reserves that likely indicate FX market interventions of the Bank of England.
It therefore appears that future inflation prospects in small floating economies are
influenced by the monetary policy of its respective large trading partner. After a
further motivation, we will introduce the data and sketch the liquidity adjustment of
breakeven inflation. Subsequently, a VAR analysis for international breakeven rates
is performed. As a viable long run relationship cannot be detected, monthly realized
correlations of breakeven rate changes are determined and conditioned on measurable
economic variables. Then, the findings and its implications for monetary policy are
discussed.
6
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Inflation, inflation uncertainty and its
impact on real activity
Understanding the interaction of inflation, inflation uncertainty, economic growth and
stability is an important aspect for the setup of theoretical models and the conduct
of monetary policy. However, empirical and theoretical contributions especially dis-
agree with regard to the influence of uncertainty on the joint determination of the
conditional means of inflation and output. Empirical studies find conflicting evidence
in particular if distinct economies are analyzed (Grier and Perry 2000, Fountas and
Karanasos, 2006, Bredin and Fountas 2009, Caporale and Kontonikas 2009). Argu-
ments from theoretical contributions suggest several influences on particular causal
relations which might be economy-specific. For example, Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986), Devereux (1989) or Ball (1992) formalize the interaction between inflation
uncertainty and inflation as a matter of (expected) interventions of monetary policy.
Examples of empirical studies that address such interrelations are Kontonikas (2004)
or Caporale and Kontonikas (2009). These studies document that the adoption of
credible and transparent strategies such as inflation targeting (IT) can influence the
interaction among inflation and inflation uncertainty (IU). Similarly, Fountas et al.
(2004) or Gillman et al. (2004) discuss dependence of the relation between IU and out-
put on the level of inflation. The inflation rate is also supposed to influence relations
between IU and the uncertainty about output (OU) in contributions by Taylor (1994)
and Fuhrer (1997), as well as the trade-off among economic growth and inflation (Ball,
Mankiw, and Romer 1988).
In case that such relations in fact depend on country specific characteristics related
to monetary policy, the ambivalence of empirical findings is well in line with the
predictions of aforementioned theoretical approaches. Conflicting empirical evidence
could reflect that monetary policy objectives tend to change over economies and time.
7
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During the recent decades, however, the hegemony of inflation targeting strategies has
possibly led to some degree of harmonization regarding the policy schemes adopted in
many economies. If particular effects are relevant within the current ’common sense’
monetary policy framework, one might expect to find them in similar form across
distinct types of economies though other economic characteristics might be markedly
distinct.
The aim of this study is to empirically identify common features in such interre-
lationships across a large range of distinct economies and a recent sample period.
Arguing that empirical investigations on causality might be conducted as tests on
whether particular linkages among variables exist reliably across distinct types of
economies, we estimate uniform bivariate GARCH-in-mean VAR models (GARCH-
M for short)1 for 34 industrialized and emerging economies. For inference, we use
the cross sectional information obtained from country specific parameter estimates.2
Extant studies discuss causality by examining if particular patterns of temporal or-
dering tend to occur systematically in individual economies. We instead regard a
relation as economically relevant if respective point estimates of intertemporal effects
can be found in similar (nonzero) magnitudes for distinct economies. We investigate
the validity of particular causalities as hypothesized by Okun (1971), Taylor (1994),
Friedman (1977), Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Devereux (1989), Black (1987) or
Pindyck (1991), but also document other systematic linkages that are less extensively
discussed in the theoretical literature. Furthermore, we investigate to which extent
monetary stability influences particular causalities by formally comparing character-
istic transmission dynamics across economies with low, medium or higher inflation
rates.
By relying on the cross sectional variation of country specific parameter estimates
for inferential purposes, we document several regularities asserted by economic theory
in an international context. Our approach allows to conduct inference regarding
the joint interactions among uncertainty variables and conditional means, along with
explicit volatility spillover effects. Our analysis is based on a rather large cross section
of 34 economies and is, furthermore, focused explicitly on the most recent policy era.
In related studies, evidence is mostly country specific, while the large amount of
information required for inference in such general models stems from a plentitude of
1Such specifications are a widely used means of quantifying and testing respective causal effects
(Grier and Perry 2000, Bredin and Fountas 2009, inter alia).
2Thereby we acknowledge arguments put forward e.g. in Grier and Grier (2006) who note that
evidence from developing countries might be a useful means to put findings from industrialized
economies into context.
8
Chapter 2 Inflation, inflation uncertainty and its impact on real activity
time observations, typically 40-50 years of monthly data. Such settings restrain the
analysis to smaller cross section dimensions (such as the G7) where data regarding
longer sampling periods is available. Moreover, during such long periods, the dynamics
of inflation and output in many economies might have been subject to structural
change (Evans and Wachtel 1993, Garcia and Perron 1996, Caporale and Kontonikas
2009). Proceeding from the assumption of structural stability, however, might lead to
unclear implications for the informative value of estimates and hypothesis testing.3
For the considered economies, we document a markedly negative effect of inflation
on output growth. Evidence for the opposite causal direction running from output
to higher inflation is also found but the effect is of considerably smaller magnitude.
Moreover, also inflation uncertainty adversely affects economic activity. Apart from
this linkage, GARCH-implied quantifications of uncertainty do not systematically
influence output growth or inflation levels. Spillover effects among volatilites of output
and inflation are potentially present, but are, however, of rather small magnitude.
Formally comparing if particular effects systematically differ across economies, we find
that real effects of inflation appear especially strong in countries with low inflation
rates. Surprisingly, the impact of uncertainties appears to be unaffected by monetary
performance. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce our econometric model. In Section 3, we discuss estimation results and
provide model diagnostics along with robustness checks. Section 4 concludes.
2.1 Empirical Framework
In this Section, we describe the econometric model and the inferential strategy of test-
ing the economic relevance of causality hypotheses as suggested by economic theory.
Firstly, we introduce the data. The GARCH-M model, which jointly expresses first-
and second order dynamics in inflation and output is described subsequently. After in-
troducing the model, the methodology used to test for causal effects by consideration
of cross-sectional variation is described.
An important aspect of this study is that our data set fundamentally differs from
those that are typically considered for joint assessments of causal effects among in-
flation, output and respective uncertainties. The consideration of a data set which
is focused on the most current time periods and a large cross section might increase
the relevance of results for monetary policy. Moreover, it might also be beneficial in
3Accounting for structural shifts in heavily parameterized models is problematic due to the ineffi-
ciency of resulting estimates.
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terms of the reliability of empirical findings. Data sets which include long series of his-
torical observations are likely to incorporate distinct macroeconomic regimes (Bruno
and Easterly 1995, Giordani and So¨derlind 2003). If changes in regimes are not taken
into account appropriately, this may lead to biased conclusions on causal linkages.
The issue of structural instability is usually addressed by means of introducing more
flexible specifications which allow for changes in the parametrization of the VAR or
GARCH process (e.g. Evans and Wachtel 1993, Kontonikas 2004, Bredin and Foun-
tas 2009). Proceeding in this way, however, requires to determine the precise timing
of structural changes. This problem has to be either resolved by means of testing
procedures (Bai and Perron 2003) or by introduction of a priori knowledge about the
timing of influential events into the modeling process. Both methods, however, are
of limited applicability if a large cross sectional data set is examined like in the case
of this study. Moreover, in case that many model parameters change, one might ask
if this approach promises a significant improvement compared to reducing the size of
the sample.
For these reasons we seek to focus on the most recent time between 1990 and
2010. Regarding the widespread adoption of inflation targeting strategies and the
recognition of excess (and instable) inflation as detrimental to economic growth during
this time, the last two decades might be labeled as the era of inflation targeting.
In focusing on this inflation targeting period, we also circumvent the problem of
determining the timing of potential changes in the parametrization of the interrelation
between first and second order moment dynamics.
2.1.1 The data
The observed variables that we consider are annualized rates of inflation pit = 1200×
log(CPIt/CPIt−1) and output growth yt = 1200 × log(IPt/IPt−1) where CPIt and
IPt denote the consumer price and industrial production index, respectively. All
series are seasonally adjusted by means of the Tramo/Seats method. We incorporate
output growth not only for reasons of comparability to extant studies like Bernanke
and Blinder (1992), Elder (2004) or Fountas and Karanasos (2004). Growth rates
have the advantage of avoiding to rely on estimated quantities as potential output,
which is necessary for measures of the output gap. The oil price growth rates oilit are
obtained for crude oil of the sort West Texas Intermediate priced in terms of domestic
currencies, that is oilit = 1200× log(WTIit/WTIi,t−1). The data set covers monthly
observations for the time t =1990M1 until t =2010M1 and 34 economies. The cross
section of economies is enlisted in Table 2.1.
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To examine the time series characteristics of inflation and output growth rates we
firstly resort to the application of heteroskedasticity consistent ADF unit root tests.
In case that country specific steady state inflation does not substantially change over
the considered sampling period one would expect inflation rates to be stationary.
Furthermore, we test for the presence of multivariate ARCH effects in order to check
if the modeling of conditional second moments is justified for these particular data
series. Table 2.1 reports the outcomes of ADF unit root tests for the inflation series
in each country while ADF statistics for output growth rates, throughout signalling
stationarity, are not listed explicitly. Inspection of ADF diagnostics suggests that
only 6 out of 34 countries feature nonstationary inflation rates for the considered
sampling period, namely Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Hungary, Peru and Poland. In
these economies, inflation levels have been rather high during recent decades and their
reduction might still be at an early stage compared with the rest of the economies
under consideration. To summarize, it appears unnecessary to transform the inflation
and output growth series in a particular way prior to setting up the econometric
model. The overall evidence on stationary inflation rates likely reflects that most of
the countries have successfully pursued a credible low inflation policy during the past
two decades.
Comparison of these results to unit root tests for inflation rates obtained for a
longer period of 1980-2010, say, reveals that nonstationarity can be rejected in a sub-
stantially smaller number of cases. It seems that a focus on the two recent decades
is beneficial as this period is characterized by a larger degree of structural stabil-
ity. Table 2.1 further shows multivariate ARCH-LM test diagnostics obtained for the
residuals of the model (2.2). Respective diagnostics indicate significant ARCH effects
in the nonstandardized model innovations for the vast majority of economies. In any
case, a potential absence of ARCH effects can be accommodated by our model as this
corresponds to a special case of equation (2.1). Therefore, the inclusion of potentially
homoscedastic inflation and output growth series may provide useful information re-
garding the overall (in)significance of causality parameters.
2.1.2 The bivariate GARCH-in-mean model
Inflation and output uncertainty may be defined and estimated in several ways (Lahiri
and Liu 2005). Specifications based on the (G)ARCH methodology (Bollerslev 1986,
Baillie 1996) have become one of the most widespread means of measuring such
unobserved variables. Engle (1982) and Ball and Cecchetti (1990) emphasize that
it is in particular the unpredicted component of overall variation which might be
11
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Table 2.1: Test diagnostics: Unit roots, Multivariate ARCH
ADFpi LM ADFpi LM ADFpi LM
Argentina (AG) −7.636
(0.49)
144.683
(0.00)
Hungary (HN) −1.85
(0.61)
103.713
(0.00)
Norway (NW) −11.73
(0.00)
60.530
(0.00)
Austria (AT) −13.78
(0.00)
80.653
(0.00)
India (IN) −3.73
(0.01)
49.413
(0.01)
Portugal(PT) −3.15
(0.03)
44.574
(0.02)
Barbados (BB) −14.16
(0.00)
101.970
(0.00)
Ireland (IR) −3.88
(0.00)
35.151
(0.14)
Peru (PE) −5.164
(0.99)
100.670
(0.00)
Belgium (BG) −13.19
(0.00)
22.303
(0.72)
Israel (IS) −6.45
(0.00)
98.350
(0.00)
Poland (PO) −4.456
(0.12)
97.411
(0.00)
Brazil (BR) −5.77
(0.45)
77.564
(0.00)
Italy (IT) −4.03
(0.00)
38.398
(0.07)
Spain (ES) −9.77
(0.00)
68.606
(0.00)
Canada (CA) −6.03
(0.00)
81.477
(0.00)
Jordan (JO) −8.35
(0.00)
62.969
(0.00)
Sweden (SD) −8.10
(0.00)
77.826
(0.00)
Columbia (CO) −1.32
(0.69)
53.917
(0.00)
Japan (JP) −13.80
(0.00)
99.320
(0.00)
Turkey (TK) −7.115
(0.00)
49.511
(0.01)
Denmark (DK) −15.88
(0.00)
48.837
(0.01)
Korea (KO) −10.17
(0.00)
180.340
(0.00)
Taiwan(TW) −19.23
(0.00)
129.675
(0.00)
Finland (FN) −5.17
(0.00)
52.996
(0.00)
Luxembourg (LU) −16.99
(0.00)
92.869
(0.00)
UK −5.88
(0.00)
210.513
(0.00)
France (FR) −13.66
(0.00)
21.976
(0.74)
Mexico(MX) −3.94
(0.02)
133.319
(0.00)
US −10.18
(0.00)
193.921
(0.00)
Germany (DE) −6.50
(0.00)
52.890
(0.00)
Malaysia (MY) −11.78
(0.00)
23.498
(0.66)
- - -
Greece (GR) −3.62
(0.04)
56.790
(0.00)
Netherlands (NL) −16.16
(0.00)
47.790
(0.01)
- - -
ADF test statistics for inflation rates and diagnostics for the multivariate ARCH-LM test. ADF test
decisions are based on heteroscedasticity-robust p-values obtained by resampling as introduced by
Cavaliere and Taylor (2008). ADF regressions include an intercept term and lag selection is according
to the SIC. Multivariate ARCH-LM diagnostics refer to ARCH effects up to the third order in the
vector residuals eit obtained from model (2.2).
most sensibly associated with uncertainty. Such volatilities may be interpreted as
representations of aggregate uncertainty. Grier and Perry (2000) point out that such
expression of uncertainty accord with theoretical concepts of inflation or output un-
certainty as discussed in contributions of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) or Devereux
(1989). For economies i = 1, ..., N , the bivariate GARCH specification for conditional
second moments in inflation and output is modeled as
Hit = C
′
iCi + A
′
iei,t−1e
′
i,t−1Ai +G
′
iHi,t−1Gi, with (2.1)
Ci =
[
ci11 ci12
0 ci22
]
, Ai =
[
ai11 ai12
ai21 ai22
]
, Gi =
[
gi11 gi12
gi21 gi22
]
, Hit =
[
h
(pi)
it h
(piy)
it
h
(piy)
it h
(y)
it
]
.
Accordingly, Hit represents uncertainties in inflation and output, while elements of Ai
(Gi) characterize the impact of inflation and output growth surprises (past inflation
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and output uncertainties) on Hit. The aforementioned inflation and output surprises,
denoted as eit = (e
(pi)
it , e
(y)
it )
′ = H
1/2
it uit, uit ∼ (0, I2), are implied by the VAR model
(
piit
yit
)
= µ+
P∑
p=1
[
γ
(pi)
ip γ
(ypi)
ip
γ
(piy)
ip γ
(y)
ip
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γip
(
pii,t−p
yi,t−p
)
+
Q∑
q=1
[
ψ
(oil)
iq 0
0 ψ
(y¯)
iq
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψiq
(
oili,t−q
y¯t−q
)
+
[
λ
(pi)
i λ
(ypi)
i
λ
(piy)
i λ
(y)
i
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λi
 √h(pi)it√
h
(y)
it
+( e(pi)it
e
(y)
it
)
, (2.2)
where µ denotes a vector of intercept terms. The parameter matrices Γip captures
linkages between the levels of inflation and output. It is often argued that, apart from
idiosyncratic influences, these variables may be driven by factors that are determined
from outside the domestic economy. Among the most important ones are oil prices or
commonalities in business cycles among open economies (Ciccarelli and Mojon 2010).
The latter determinant is expressed as y¯t−1 = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 yi,t−1, i.e. the average
over economy-specific output growth rates. Potential impacts of oili,t−1 and y¯t−1 are
represented by means of the parameters in Ψiq, whereas the effect of inflation and
output uncertainties
√
h
(pi)
it and
√
h
(y)
it is quantified in terms of the matrix Λi.
2.1.3 Implementation details
For all countries, the lag orders in (2.2) are chosen as P = 12 and Q = 3. In (2.1),
the 2 × 2 parameter matrices Ai and Gi are fully parameterized, while its upper left
elements a11 and g11 are restricted to be positive to guarantee the identification of pa-
rameters (Engle and Kroner 1995). Proceeding in this way we allow for cross-equation
linkages of second order dynamics in (2.1). Formulating the bivariate GARCH model
in (2.1) as a BEKK specification (Engle and Kroner 1995) obtains parameter esti-
mates in terms of nonlinear functions. For this reason we report empirical results for
estimates of Ai and Bi by reformulating BEKK-implied results in terms of the so-
called half-vec form (Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge 1988) that enables straightfor-
ward interpretation.4 The system as described in (2.2) and (2.1) is estimated for each
4For this purpose, define ht ≡ vech(Ht) and νt ≡ vech(ete′t), omitting country indices for notational
convenience. Then, equation (2.1) might be reformulated in terms of ht = c+A
∗νit−1 +G
∗ht−1,
deriving model parameters M∗ ∈ {A∗, G∗} from their counterparts M ∈ {A,G} in (2.1) as
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country i = 1, . . . , 34 individually by numerical optimization of the likelihood function
regarding model disturbances uit. Owing to potential nonnormality of uit, resulting
quantifications of causality coefficients are regarded as Quasi-Maximum-Likelihood
estimates (Comte and Lieberman 2003).
2.1.4 Inference
To account for the heterogeneity inherent in country-specific inflation and output
dynamics, the system (2.1) and (2.2) is estimated individually for each economy.
To summarize the findings regarding parameters obtained in this way for particular
economies, the mean-group (MG) estimation method as introduced by Pesaran and
Smith (1995) is employed.
In the following, let θi represent any parameter from (2.1) or (2.2) for economy i.
The MG estimator then reads as
θ¯ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
θi. (2.3)
As an indication of whether relations in (2.1) and (2.2) feature qualitatively similar
parameters over the cross section, we consider the following t-statistic:
t =
√
N
θ¯
σ
, (2.4)
where σ =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(θi − θ¯)2, (2.5)
following Coakley, Fuertes and Smith (2001). According to Pesaran and Smith (1995),
the estimator in (2.3) is suitable for dynamic models and data sets featuring relatively
large cross-section and time dimensions. In contrast to most other panel techniques,
moreover, it does not rely on a parameter homogeneity assumption. Furthermore,
the cross sectional t−statistic in (2.4) allows for accurate inference even in cases of
follows:
M∗ =
 m211 2m11m21 m221m11m12 m21m12 +m11m22 m21m22
m212 2m12m22 m
2
22
 .
For example, noting that ht = [h
(pi)
it h
(piy)
it h
(y)
it ]
′, the lower left element given by m212, where
m212 ∈ {g212, a212}, quantifies the nonnegative effect that lagged inflation uncertainty/
lagged inflation shocks exerts on output uncertainty.
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nonstationary variables and small to moderate degrees of correlation among economy-
specific coefficient estimates (Coakley, Fuertes and Smith 2001, Ibragimov and Mueller
2010). Significance of (2.4) indicates that a particular effect holds in similar form
across distinct types of economies. In the following, we will denote such effects as
being ”economically relevant”.
2.2 Hypotheses about inflation and output dynamics
Most of the potential relations between inflation, output and corresponding uncer-
tainties in inflation and output are discussed in the theoretical literature. In the first
part of this Section, we summarize theoretical hypotheses on causalities that we can
empirically address in a world-wide context in the framework of the model described
above. In the second part, we acknowledge that many contributions motivate causal
effects for particular variables to arise as a matter of monetary policy. Accordingly,
we summarize respective hypotheses stressing that particular effects might depend on
the characteristics of respective economies.
The way in which linkages between inflation and output are understood has changed
considerably since the initial formulation of the Phillips curve. Prominent contribu-
tions in this literature are Samuelson and Solow (1960) or Lucas and Sargent (1979),
inter alia. While the existence of a long term tradeoff between the two quantities
is highly controversial, most economists agree that a relation between inflation and
measures of real output is present for the short- to medium term. This is documented
in several empirical studies (e.g. King and Watson 1994, Gal´ı and Gertler 1999,
Sbordone 2005). Accordingly, short-run Phillips curve dynamics are an important
building block in modern DSGE models (Smets and Wouters 2010). The relation
between uncertainties and the conditional means of inflation and output has equiv-
alently attracted considerable attention in the theoretical literature. The discussion
on respective relations and their economic relevance, however, is still a matter of con-
troversy. In Table 2.2, some of the most prominent hypotheses on the causal impact
among the variables we consider are summarized. Not all of the enlisted effects are
considered explicitly within our study.
Both the signs and directions of potential causal effects are in many cases contro-
versial. Widely cited theoretical concepts of the relation between inflation and IU are
Friedman (1977), Ball (1992), Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) or Devereux (1989). In
Friedman (1977) and Ball (1992), it is argued that it is the level of inflation which
gives rise to IU, whereas Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Devereux (1989) describe
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Table 2.2: Theoretical hypotheses on causal effects and their dependence on pi
Hypothesis Reference & Form Effect in model (1)-(2)
pi
+→ y IPC BMR ∑3p=1 γ(piy)ip , ∑12p=1 γ(piy)ip
y
+→ pi PC BMR ∑3p=1 γ(ypi)ip , ∑12p=1 γ(ypi)ip
IU
±→ y FDS G λ(piy)
IU
±→ pi CMD CMD λ(pi)
OU
±→ y BP - λ(y)
OU
+→ pi DE - λ(ypi)
OU
±↔ IU T TF a221, g221, a212, g212
pi
+→ IU FB - implicit
Hypotheses on inflation and output dynamics. In the column ’Reference & Form’, references for
theoretical hypotheses on causalities (left part) and their relation to monetary performance (right
part) are given in abbreviated form. Namely, ’(I)PC’ is short for (Inverted) Phillips curve, while
’BMR’ is Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988). Furthermore, ’FDS’ is Friedman (1977) or Dotsey and
Sartre (2000), ’CMD’ is Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Devereux (1989), ’T’ is short for Taylor
(1994), ’DE’ is Devereux (1989), ’TF’ is Taylor (1994) and Fuhrer (1997), while ’FB’ is Friedman
(1977) and Ball (1992). For notational convenience, we will denote the ’TF’ implied second order
effects as a(ypi), g(ypi), a(piy), g(piy) later on.
scenarios where causality points in the opposite direction. Positive output effects of
IU are described by e.g. Dotsey and Sarte (2000), who introduce a model in which
IU leads to increases in investment through precautionary savings. In contrast, Fried-
man (1977), for example, describes a negative effect of IU on output. He argues
that inflation uncertainty tends to reduce the effectiveness of the price mechanism
in allocating resources efficiently. Moreover, Sargent (1993) postulates that a lack of
central bank credibility is detrimental to output, where credibility might be associ-
ated with low levels of IU (Giordani and So¨derlind 2003). With respect to the relation
between output and OU, Black (1987) postulates that higher output uncertainty in-
creases output growth since the latter might reflect an engagement in riskier projects.
In contrast, according to the model of Pindyck (1991), OU has a negative influence
on output growth since irreversible investment projects tend to be postponed under
higher uncertainty. In Devereux (1989), output uncertainty increases the average rate
of inflation by an implicit reduction of wage indexation which provides an incentive
for policymakers to generate inflation surprises more frequently.
When hypotheses like the ones stated above are investigated, it is usually implicitly
assumed that the relation in question holds invariably for distinct economies. The way
in which many assertions regarding causality are formulated, however, suggests that
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some of them might only prevail in some economies that share certain characteristics,
in particular regarding the implementation and the success of monetary policy. For
instance, as the average level of inflation influences the price adjustment frequency,
it might affect the output-inflation trade-off (Ball, Mankiw, and Romer 1988). Fur-
ther examples include the widely cited models of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) or
Devereux (1989), where only IU in excess of a certain level might gain potential to
impact on inflation. Other such examples are Gillman et al. (2004) who discuss a
potentially inflation-dependent effect of IU on output and also provide empirical ev-
idence for their conjecture. Fountas et al. (2004) and Neanidis and Savva (2011)
document that the constitutional frame of monetary policy can have an influence on
empirical estimates of a causal impact of IU on growth. Moreover, Taylor (1994) and
Fuhrer (1997) assert that the relation between IU and OU might depend on the level
of inflation. In particular, Fuhrer (1997) points out that a tradeoff between IU and
OU is particularly relevant for low-inflation economies. Gylfason and Herbertsson
(2001) postulate that in low inflation countries, growth is more sensitive to inflation
changes than in high inflation countries.
Accordingly, though the literature does not provide consensus on both the sign and
the direction of potential causalities, it appears rather unanimous in stressing the
potential role of monetary performance as an important source of systematic cross
sectional heterogeneity. Hence we focus on two empirical questions. On the one hand,
we address if particular hypotheses appear economically relevant across the full cross
section. On the other hand, we examine how sensitive associated effects are with
respect to the characteristics of economies. For this purpose we consider average
causal relations in subsamples of the cross section which are characterized by distinct
levels of inflation. We argue that the overall level of inflation over several years should
be associated with the reliability of the respective economy’s monetary authority and
its success in anchoring inflation expectations.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Causal linkages
In this Section, we analyze the outcomes of the model (2.1)-(2.2) over the considered
set of economies. By means of studying parameter variation across economies, we
investigate the strength of evidence for the hypotheses summarized in Table 2.2. Fur-
thermore, we discuss mean impulse response functions (IRFs) regarding surprises in
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inflation and output.5 Proceeding in this way we highlight potential causal linkages
with emphasis on a more detailed description of the shock response of the variables in
question. Mean group estimates regarding relations between output and inflation from
VAR estimates in (2.2) are reported in Table 2.3. To summarize the informational
content of AR coefficients, we further provide cross sectional averages of accumulated
country specific impacts obtained over the initial three (twelve) lags. The Table also
contains the effects of uncertainty variables in Hit on the levels of output and inflation,
whereas accumulated IRFs are depicted in Figure 2.1. A brief discussion of diagnostic
tests regarding the model specification concludes.
The results given in Table 2.3 show that inflation and output are significantly
interrelated. In case of the impact of productivity growth on inflation quantified by
γ¯ypiip , most lag coefficients are positive, where four out of 12 are significant. The lag
parameters γ¯piyip , which capture the effect of inflation on output tend to be negative,
while being significant in two cases. Cross sectional averages of accumulated quarterly
impacts are γ¯
(ypi)
3 = 0.016 and γ¯
(piy)
3 = 0.25, respectively, where only the former
estimate is significant. Accumulating over all lag coefficients up to one year, however,
results in estimates γ¯
(ypi)
12 = 0.04 and γ¯
(piy)
12 = −0.96 that are both significant at the
1% level. Thus, a 1% increase in output growth has an associated inflation effect of
only 4 basis points, whereas an increase in inflation by 1% is followed by a decrease
in output of almost 1%.6 In terms of empirical magnitude, therefore, the estimated
effect of inflation on output appears by far more relevant than the impact that output
exerts on inflation. However, the influence that output exerts on inflation is found to
be more systematic across economies and also takes, on average, less time to become
evident than the reverse effect. This impression is confirmed by the accumulated (long
run) IRFs depicted in Figure 2.1, where a surprise in output tends to be followed by
a rise in the price level pretty quickly. Though occurring with a time lag, however,
a large fraction of the impact of a surprise in inflation on output materializes during
the first year after the shock.
Our results might imply that, though the effect of output on inflation can be found
almost immediately and reliably across economies, the consequences of excess inflation
might be of greater economic importance in modern economies.
5The underlying country specific impulse response functions for GARCH-M VAR models are cal-
culated according to Elder (2004).
6A negative impact of inflation on output growth is in line with empirical studies such as Barro
(1996), Temple (2000), Khan (2001) or Gillman and Kejak (2005).
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Table 2.3: Mean group estimation of equation (1)
Eq pit yt
l yt−l pit−l oilt−l yt−l pit−l y¯t−l
1 0.0051
(1.366)
0.1806
(4.196)
0.0047
(7.775)
−0.3815
(−7.235)
0.1572
(1.138)
0.1855
(2.982)
2 0.0042
(1.105)
0.0238
(1.233)
0.0003
(0.000)
−0.2249
(−5.886)
−0.0392
(−0.416)
0.3636
(0.364)
3 0.0064
(3.047)
0.0644
(4.067)
0.0006
(1.050)
−0.1350
(−4.449)
0.1330
(1.087)
0.3791
(5.920)
4 0.0107
(4.504)
0.0416
(3.493)
- −0.0447
(−1.938)
0.0177
(0.146)
-
5 0.0047
(1.316)
0.0402
(3.203)
- 0.0205
(1.294)
−0.2833
(−2.322)
-
6 0.0041
(2.019)
0.0606
(4.706)
- 0.0457
(2.214)
−0.1228
(−1.284)
-
7 0.0026
(1.070)
0.0465
(3.463)
- −0.0015
(−0.079)
−0.1474
(−1.421)
-
8 0.0061
(2.151)
0.0526
(3.841)
- −0.0079
(−0.417)
−0.0610
(−0.579)
-
9 −0.0034
(−1.213)
0.0400
(3.205)
- 0.0351
(1.831)
−0.1324
(−1.047)
-
10 −0.0006
(−0.237)
0.0585
(3.533)
- −0.0296
(−1.950)
−0.1446
(−1.033)
-
11 −0.0017
(−0.692)
0.0647
(4.629)
- −0.0403
(−2.325)
−0.0046
(−0.040)
-
12 −0.0001
(−0.039)
−0.0725
(−2.956)
- −0.0273
(−1.484)
−0.3370
(−2.375)
-∑3
l=1 0.0157
(2.170)
0.2688
(5.317)
0.0056
(5.507)
−0.7415
(−7.604)
0.2509
(1.206)
0.9282
(6.476)∑12
l=1 0.0381
(3.560)
0.6010
(11.966)
- −0.7916
(−6.128)
−0.9646
(−3.424)
-
ht 0.0329
(0.647)
−0.4616
(−1.298)
- −0.2146
(−0.507)
−2.9505
(−2.848)
-
Mean group VAR(12) diagnostics for inflation and output growth summarizing the informa-
tional content of individual point estimates of VAR(12) models with BEKK(1,1)-GARCH-M
type residuals estimated for 34 economies. t−statistics according to (2.4) are given in paren-
theses.
∑3
l=1 (
∑12
l=1) is short for lag coefficients accumulated up to 3 (12) months.
Hence, one might conjecture that, in modern economies that tend to be charac-
terized by well anchored inflation expectations, inflation is not overly sensitive to
economic activity, but output growth tends to be quite vulnerable to inflation. The
estimated inflation effect on output appears even more relevant when it is compared,
for instance, to the accumulated effect of the global average output growth on domes-
tic growth rates ψ¯
(y¯)
3 . The response of domestic growth to the world business cycle
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has the same magnitude as the respective inflation effect. Hence, on average over the
considered cross section, the output loss due to a moderate increase in inflation might
be comparable to the one incurred in case of a 1% decrease in average world output
growth.
Moreover, we find considerable support for an adverse effect of IU on output growth.
In 27 out of 34 economies, we observe negative coefficient estimates for the linkage
running from IU to output growth rates. The average effect of IU on output growth is
λ¯(piy)=-2.95, with the associated t-ratio indicating significance at the 1% level. To pro-
vide a benchmark, annualized US inflation and production have unconditional means
of about 2.7 % and 1.7%, whereas the unconditional standard deviations amount to
0.27 % and 0.8% for inflation and output, respectively. Accordingly, the statistically
significant negative impact of inflation and inflation uncertainty on industrial produc-
tion also appear to be relevant in terms of economic magnitude. Put differently, an
effect of both inflation and IU on the real economy can be observed for a considerable
part of the cross section. In the related literature, the effects of inflation and IU
are often not treated separately as it is often presumed that a strong linkage exists
between the two variables. The results in Table 2.3, however, suggest that potential
disadvantages may arise from IU in addition to effects associated with the level of
inflation.
Table 2.4: Mean group estimates for equation (2)
half-vec dynamics of VAR(12) residuals
Eq e
(pi)2
t−1 e
(pi)
t−1e
(y)
t−1 e
(y)2
t−1 h
(pi)
t−1 h
(piy)
t−1 h
(y)
t−1
h
(pi)
t 0.3173
(7.485)
0.0106
(2.154)
0.0014
(2.107)
0.3422
(6.049)
0.0050
(1.333)
0.0004
(2.529)
h
(piy)
t 0.0046
(1.918)
0.1796
(8.625)
−0.0000
(−0.009)
0.0049
(0.451)
0.3436
(7.365)
0.0027
(1.282)
h
(y)
t 0.0023
(2.814)
0.0104
(1.873)
0.1697
(6.417)
0.0058
(1.703)
0.0143
(0.795)
0.4376
(8.358)
Mean group BEKK implied half-vec diagnostics for inflation and output uncertainties sum-
marizing the informational content of individual point estimates of (2.1) for 34 economies.
t−statistics according to (2.4) are given in parentheses.
20
Chapter 2 Inflation, inflation uncertainty and its impact on real activity
e˜
(pi)
0 → pit e˜(y)0 → pit
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
e˜
(pi)
0 → yt e˜(y)0 → yt
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
−3
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Figure 2.1: Average impulse response functions (accumulated)
Mean group accumulated impulse response functions obtained by averaging country spe-
cific impulse response function estimates. Country specific impulse response function for
GARCH-M VAR models are calculated according to Elder (2004). Confidence bands are
calculated as 2 times the cross sectional standard deviation divided by
√
N .
On the other hand, the hypotheses which suggest an impact of IU on inflation cannot
be confirmed noting that the coefficient average λ¯(pi) is insignificant even at the 10%
nominal level. Moreover, in contrast to Fountas, Karanasos and Kim (2002), we do
not find evidence for the hypothesis that OU is negatively related to output growth,
i.e. stabilization objectives do not seem to be beneficial regarding the level of output
growth.
Summarizing evidence regarding linkages among IU and OU in an analogous way,
corresponding mean group parameters are reported in Table 2.4. Due to the positiv-
ity restriction imposed on the spillover parameters in the framework of the BEKK
21
Chapter 2 Inflation, inflation uncertainty and its impact on real activity
specification, significance of these coefficients is less meaningful from the perspective
of economic relevance. In contrast, the insignificance of the effect of IU on OU suggest
rather strong evidence against the hypothesis that IU impacts on OU, which is doc-
umented by Grier et al. (2004). In line with Grier et al. (2004), however, the reverse
effect of OU on IU and lagged idiosyncratic influences are throughout significant,
albeit numerically small.
Finally, we document that modeling relations between the nominal and real econ-
omy by means of the particular model (2.1)-(2.2) is not only guided by the demand
for a parametrization of the economic hypotheses in question. It seems also justified
from an empirical perspective, i.e. by means of diagnostic tests regarding the model
specification. Firstly, multivariate ARCH-LM tests are considered to judge the effec-
tiveness of the specification (2.1) in expressing the evolution of inflation and output
uncertainties. Second, we employ multivariate Breusch-Pagan LM test statistics to
test for serial correlation up to order 6 in the standardized residuals uit = H
−1/2
it eit.
For almost all countries in the cross section, neither ARCH effects nor autocorrela-
tions can be detected in uit. Table 2.5 summarizes the diagnostic test results across
economies.
Table 2.5: Standardized Residuals: Multivariate diagnostics
SC ARCH SC ARCH SC ARCH
AG 19.1 65.7 GR 47.1∗ 54.3 NL 26.6 61.7
AT 26.1 80.7 HN 20.7 34.1 NW 26.3 31.9
BB 28.6 73.5 IN 24.2 52.4 PT 33.3 39.0
BG 39.8 59.8 IR 28.6 33.6 PE 40.0 73.8
BR 36.4 63.40 IS 56.2∗ 62.8 Po 21.2 57.4
CA 48.1∗ 31.9 IT 41.1 43.4 ES 30.0 48.9
CH 18.0 64.7 JO 20.1 54.9 SD 35.3 30.0
CO 29.7 48.0 JP 27.5 30.6 TK 24.8 56.8
DK 31.8 47.3 KO 23.8 64.9 TW 38.0 47.0
FN 38.8 47.6 LU 38.3 79.2 UK 43.9∗ 100.1∗
FR 35.7 43.9 MX 24.4 27.1 US 31.9 45.0
DE 27.8 36.6 MY 38.2 43.9 - - -
Multivariate residual diagnostics for country specific system estimates. SC (ARCH) is
short for the multivariate Breusch-Pagan LM-test statistic for serial correlation (the
LM-test statistic for multivariate ARCH effects) up to order 6 in the standardized
vector residuals uˆit. Significance at the 1% level is indicated by asterisks.
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2.3.2 Causality analysis for distinct inflation environments
In addition to the discussion of results for the entire cross section, we investigate
results obtained by consideration of particular subgroups in the following.
Several theoretical contributions postulate that causal relationships among infla-
tion, output and respective uncertainties might be influenced by certain characteristics
of the economies in question. In particular, one might consider the average magni-
tude of the inflation rate over some longer time period as a determinant of causal
linkages. The average inflation rate thereby serves as an indication for the reliability
of the respective economy’s monetary authority and its success in anchoring inflation
expectations. To investigate on whether estimates differ systematically across sub-
groups of economies, we examine coefficient averages regarding particular subgroups
of economies. Respective subgroups are defined with respect to their members’ aver-
age inflation rates, p¯i
(∗)
i· = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 piit, where ∗ ∈ {l, m, h} indicates membership in
either group of low, medium or high inflation economies. The latter is characterized
by
p¯i
(l)
i· ≤ bl < p¯i(m)i· ≤ bm < p¯i(h)i· , (2.6)
with bl = 2.5, bm = 5 as boundary values. Subgroup specific parameter averages
θ¯∗ obtain as averages over a number of N∗ economies as in the case of (2.4) for the
entire cross section. Moreover, σ∗ is obtained for respective cross section members in
analogy to (2.5). To assess the significance of differences in coefficients in a pairwise
subsample comparison we employ the two-sample t-statistic
ta,b =
θ¯a − θ¯b√
1
Na−1
σ2a +
1
Nb−1
σ2b
, where {a, b} ∈ {l, m; l, h;m, h}. (2.7)
Table 2.6 provides mean parameter estimates for Model (1)-(2) for the latter sub-
groups along with respective pairwise two-sample t−statistics. Most of the effects
documented in the previous section cannot be rejected to be equal across economies
with distinct inflation experiences. However, in low inflation economies, real effects of
inflation appear to be stronger; Compared to medium and high inflation economies,
inflation tends to be followed by higher economic growth in the subsequent quarter.
In turn, over the rest of the year, the reduction of output growth is significantly more
pronounced both in terms of size and significance of respective coefficients.
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Table 2.6: subsample estimates and mean differences
eq coef l m h l vs m l vs h m vs h
pi
∑3
1 γ
(ypi) 0.0202
(2.149)
0.0139
(1.199)
0.1951
(1.147)
0.0063
(0.434)
−0.1749
(−1.145)
−0.1811
(−1.037)∑12
1 γ
(ypi) 0.0368
(2.147)
0.0387
(2.324)
0.1630
(1.371)
−0.0019
(−0.080)
−0.1262
(−1.167)
−0.1243
(−1.012)∑3
1 γ
(pi) 0.0404
(0.677)
0.2636
(3.840)
0.4981
(6.645)
−0.2232
(−2.516)
−0.4577
(−4.948)
−0.2345
(−2.351)∑12
1 γ
(pi) 0.4132
(7.786)
0.5475
(5.640)
0.8471
(19.593)
−0.1343
(−1.320)
−0.4340
(−6.326)
−0.2996
(−2.987)
λ(ypi) 0.0082
(0.153)
0.0197
(0.133)
0.1478
(1.227)
−0.0115
(−0.082)
−0.1395
(−1.142)
−0.1280
(−0.694)
λ(pi) 0.0557
(0.248)
−1.2147
(−1.056)
−0.2601
(−1.141)
1.2703
(1.257)
0.3158
(1.003)
−0.9546
(−0.875)∑3
1 δ
(oil) 0.0044
(3.563)
0.0083
(3.268)
0.0036
(2.640)
−0.0039
(−1.517)
0.0008
(0.458)
0.0047
(1.724)
y
∑3
1 γ
(y) −0.7178
(−4.054)
−0.7196
(−4.435)
−0.6191
(−2.817)
0.0018
(0.007)
−0.0986
(−0.361)
−0.1004
(−0.371)∑12
1 γ
(y) −0.7446
(−3.423)
−0.6442
(−2.788)
−0.7403
(−2.780)
−0.1004
(−0.321)
−0.0043
(−0.013)
0.0961
(0.277)∑3
1 γ
(piy) 0.8861
(2.045)
−0.0857
(−0.268)
−0.1442
(−1.260)
0.9718
(1.746)
1.0303
(2.176)
0.0585
(0.183)∑12
1 γ
(piy) −1.8931
(−3.363)
−0.7182
(−1.863)
−0.0824
(−0.352)
−1.1748
(−1.653)
−1.8106
(−2.846)
−0.6358
(−1.477)
λ(y) 0.1973
(0.522)
−0.8223
(−0.656)
−0.2569
(−0.479)
1.0196
(0.888)
0.4542
(0.724)
−0.5654
(−0.440)
λ(piy) −2.2340
(−1.980)
−5.5277
(−1.905)
−1.4148
(−1.206)
3.2937
(1.188)
−0.8192
(−0.513)
−4.1129
(−1.396)∑3
1 δ
(y¯) 1.0705
(4.975)
0.7117
(2.890)
0.7040
(2.867)
0.3588
(1.124)
0.3665
(1.152)
0.0077
(0.023)
hpi a(ypi) 0.0011
(1.714)
0.0031
(1.511)
0.0001
(2.107)
−0.0020
(−1.087)
0.0009
(1.426)
0.0030
(1.568)
a(pi) 0.3252
(4.713)
0.1983
(2.973)
0.3904
(5.580)
0.1269
(1.324)
−0.0652
(−0.675)
−0.1921
(−2.029)
g(ypi) 0.0001
(2.560)
0.0011
(2.055)
0.0002
(2.049)
−0.0009
(−2.082)
−0.0000
(−0.109)
0.0009
(1.887)
g(pi) 0.2498
(2.873)
0.4229
(4.057)
0.3782
(3.557)
−0.1731
(−1.315)
−0.1285
(−0.967)
0.0446
(0.306)
hy a(y) 0.1684
(3.099)
0.1699
(3.684)
0.2204
(3.751)
−0.0015
(−0.021)
−0.0520
(−0.664)
−0.0505
(−0.684)
a(piy) 0.0014
(1.406)
0.0037
(1.771)
0.0019
(1.678)
−0.0023
(−1.074)
−0.0005
(−0.319)
0.0018
(0.793)
g(y) 0.3560
(3.746)
0.5219
(5.980)
0.4111
(4.618)
−0.1659
(−1.278)
−0.0550
(−0.426)
0.1108
(0.909)
g(piy) 0.0013
(1.502)
0.0121
(1.200)
0.0053
(1.015)
−0.0108
(−1.251)
−0.0040
(−0.840)
0.0068
(0.628)
Mean group diagnostics for model (2.1)-(2.2) obtained for distinct subgroups of low (l),
medium (m) and high (h) inflation economies defined according to (2.6) (left hand side). The
right hand side provides two-sample t-test statistics for pairwise comparisons of coefficient
subgroup means according to (2.7).
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Figure 2.2: Average IRFs for low and medium inflation economies (accumulated)
Mean group accumulated IRFs for economies with average inflation below 2.5% (between 2.5% and
5%) in the left (right) panel. Country specific IRFs for GARCH-M VAR models are derived according
to Elder (2004). Confidence bands are 2 times the group specific cross sectional standard deviation
divided by
√
K, K = {13; 10}.
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This might be a result of scale effects, i.e. in economies with strongly accelerat-
ing prices, the real impact of an additional percentage rise in inflation is comparably
smaller than an increase in an economy which has been characterized by low average
inflation beforehand. Impulse responses depicted in Figure 2.2 illustrate the char-
acteristic dynamics of output that tend to follow inflation shocks. Comparing the
IRFs for low- and intermediate inflation regimes7 it can be seen that the relation
is most clear-cut for the low inflation economies, which exhibit lower standard de-
viations among their subgroup. In turn, IRFs further suggest that inflation tends
to rise more markedly after a positive output shock in medium inflation economies
compared to low inflation economies, which might be due to imperfect anchoring of
inflation expectations.
Interestingly, the effect of IU on output growth does not significantly differ across
economies with distinct inflation experiences. Influences of predetermined variables
oilt−1 and y¯t−1 are throughout unaffected with respect to the average inflation level.
Moreover, volatility spillovers as obtained in the previous section also appear to be
unaffected by the average level of inflation in the respective economies. Both the
insignificance of the IU impact on output growth uncertainty and the significance of
the other coefficients expressing uncertainty linkages are robust with respect to the
consideration of distinct subgroups.
We conclude that there is only moderate evidence that particular interrelation-
ships of those enlisted in Table (2.2) are dominated by issues of monetary stability.
Moreover, effects that appear to depend on monetary stability such as the impact of
inflation on output growth only differ in terms of magnitudes rather than in terms of
sign or significance.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we assess common patterns in the interaction of inflation, output
and their uncertainties. We focus on the recent times when inflation targeting has
been the predominantly adopted rule of monetary policy and consider a large cross
section of 34 developed and emerging economies. Considering economy-specific es-
timates obtained from standard bivariate GARCH-in-mean models, we infer on the
economic significance of causality hypotheses from the theoretical literature from a
cross sectional perspective. We document marked influences of nominal quantities
7We do not consider impulse response functions for higher inflation economies. Given that inflation
rates in 6 out of 11 high inflation economies are non-stationary, an aggregation of country specific
impulse responses appears hardly meaningful.
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on output growth. Both the level of inflation and the associated uncertainty tend to
lower output growth across a wide range of distinct economies. We further find that
theoretical arguments regarding the dependency of causal linkages on the monetary
policy framework are relevant for some of the relations we investigate. Particularly,
the effects of inflation on output appear most pronounced for economies with low av-
erage inflation rates. However, the negative impact of inflation uncertainty on output
growth appears to hold irrespective of the monetary regime. Furthermore, there exist
significant spillover effects among uncertainties in output and inflation. The effect,
however, seems to point from output uncertainty to inflation uncertainty, whereas the
opposite impact is not significant.
To summarize, we find lower and stable inflation rates to be beneficial for output
growth. This relation appears to hold irrespectively of whether developed or economies
in transition are considered.
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Capital market integration
3.1 Motivation
Capital market integration is a core issue of international economics since it improves
the allocation of investment (Laeven 2003, Galindo, Schiantarelli and Weiss 2007,
Abiad, Oomes and Ueda 2007), lowers the volatility of consumption (Bekaert, Harvey
and Lundblad 2006) and fosters growth (Rousseau 2003, Bekaert, Harvey and Lund-
blad 2005, Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel 2007).1 In the literature, several
approaches have been applied to assess capital market integration. These are based
on the international correlation of consumption (Obstfeld 1994, Bekaert, Harvey and
Lundblad 2006), the relation of savings and investment (Feldstein and Horioka 1980,
Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002), international capital flows (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lums-
daine 2003, Baele, Ferrando, Ho¨rdahl, Krylova and Monnet 2004) or the law of one
price (e.g. Frankel 1992, Bekaert and Harvey 1995, Baele et al. 2004, Hardouvelis,
Malliaropulos and Priestley 2006). The most direct approaches to measure capital
market integration are based on the law of one price, which implies that capital can
be raised at equal global cost. Focussing on the cost of external capital, studies in the
field of international macroeconomics have traditionally employed interest rate parity
conditions in covered, uncovered or real terms to test for capital market integration
(Frankel 1992).2
In this chapter, we test for capital market integration in terms of the real interest
rate parity (RIP). Under capital market integration, free flow of capital and technol-
ogy diffusion tend to equalize the cost of long term capital and the marginal return
1See also Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003) for negative evidence on growth effects.
2Another important approach based on the law of one price is followed in international finance,
where asset pricing models are used to uncover if the cost of equity capital is determined with
respect to global or local risks (see e.g. Bekaert and Harvey 1995, Hardouvelis et al. 2006,
Carrieri, Errunza and Hogan 2009).
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on national production possibilities (Obstfeld and Taylor 2002). Accordingly, the RIP
indicates the efficiency of capital allocation and the exploitation of comparative ad-
vantages. The RIP further suggests that goods markets are integrated since it jointly
implies the uncovered interest rate parity and the ex-ante relative purchasing power
parity (UIP and PPP, hereafter).
In light of liberalized capital markets the weak evidence for the RIP has puzzled
economists. Initially, Mishkin (1984), Cumby and Mishkin (1986) and Merrik and
Saunders (1986) rejected the equality of international real interest rates (RIRs). Sub-
sequently, research focused on the long run convergence of international RIRs (Edi-
son and Pauls 1993, Goodwin and Grennes 1994, Moosa and Bhatti 1995, Chinn and
Frankel 1995, Mac Donald and Nagayasu 2000, Obstfeld and Taylor 2002, Goldberg
2003, Mancuso, Goodwin and Grennes 2003, Ferrera and Ledesma 2007). While RIRs
are often found to be cointegrated, long run parity relationships hardly receive em-
pirical support. Likewise, cross country RIR differentials (RIDs) are often diagnosed
to be non-stationary.
The empirical literature still suffers from three caveats. Firstly, with the exceptions
of Fujii and Chinn (2001) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2002), empirical contributions
rely on short maturity RIRs, typically 3 months. For inference on capital market
integration, however, long term RIRs should be considered since they most directly
reflect financing costs for capital investments (Obstfeld and Taylor 2002). Further-
more, the use of long term instruments reduces the potential shortcomings invoked
by the failure of the ex-ante relative PPP and the UIP in the short run (Fujii and
Chinn 2001, Obstfeld and Taylor 2002).3 The relative PPP is accepted as a reason-
able assumption only over long time horizons (Taylor and Taylor 2004). Similarly,
the UIP receives stronger support for long term interest rates (Chinn and Meredith
2004). Hence, it is more likely that both conditions hold ex-ante if one considers
financing of long term capital investments. Secondly, the studies to investigate the
convergence of long term RIRs tend to suffer from imprecise RIR approximations.4
RIRs are throughout determined by means of the Fisher hypothesis (Fisher 1930)
which requires an approximation of expected inflation and the absence of inflation
risk. To measure expected inflation, studies proceed from the assumption of ratio-
nal expectations (e.g. Fujii and Chinn 2001 or Obstfeld and Taylor 2002) or employ
model implied expectations (e.g. Al-Awad and Goodwin 1998, Fujii and Chinn 2001).
Especially for ex-ante long run inflation, however, these approaches fail to guarantee
3Empirical findings in Chung and Crowder (2004) attribute the failure of the RIP to the violation
of both conditions.
4Notably, any systematic bias implies nonzero RIDs in presence of market integration.
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idiosyncratic approximation errors at the monthly or quarterly frequency.5 Moreover,
the disregard of inflation risk is another source of systematic measurement errors.
Thirdly, with the exceptions of Chinn and Frankel (1995) and Goodwin and Grennes
(1994), studies rarely investigate market integration explicitly from the perspective of
higher dimensional systems. The system approach provides one further testable rank
condition that is necessary (though not sufficient) for capital market integration.
We assess capital market integration for a subsystem of the G7 by testing for the
convergence of observed ex-ante long term RIRs as implied by treasury inflation pro-
tected securities (TIPS). The sample covers monthly RIR quotes for Canada (CA),
France (FR), the UK and the US over the period 2000/1-2010/1. At first, we apply
unit root tests to RIDs. In addition, we test for cointegration among RIRs and provide
LR statistics for overidentifying parameter restrictions implied by the RIP. Our results
suggest that CA, FR, UK and US capital markets are integrated. While all RIDs are
diagnosed stationary around zero, bivariate cointegration analysis also supports the
long run RIP. Full dimensional cointegration analysis suggests global linkage to the
US market. Moreover, we cannot reject that the estimated cointegration relationships
reflect the integration of CA, FR, UK and US capital markets. Addressing the lack of
empirical support that the RIP receives in related studies, we reconsider our analysis
by employing conventional RIR approximations. We find evidence that both the fail-
ure of short run ex-ante relative PPP or UIP, and presumably weak approximations of
long term RIRs might induce an empirical rejection of the RIP in presence of capital
market integration.
In Section 3.2 we briefly discuss the economic theory, the hypotheses and the rea-
soning behind the test specifications. Empirical results are provided in Section 3.3. In
Section 3.4 capital market integration is reinvestigated in terms of conventional RIR
measures. Section 3.5 summarizes and concludes.
3.2 Testing for capital market integration
3.2.1 On RIP and inflation indexed interest rates
In this study, capital market integration is diagnosed with reference to the law of one
price. Two capital markets are integrated if the expected real cost of capital and,
implicitly, the expected marginal yields on investment tend to equalize in the long
run. This holds under free flow of capital and frictionless markets if i) assets denoted
5In particular, ex-post ten year inflation might not provide an unbiased measure of ex-ante ten year
inflation.
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in distinct currencies are regarded as substitutes and ii) goods market integration
leads to expected exchange rate changes that reflect expected inflation differentials.
Consider the UIP condition,6
ξ
(i)
t,k − ξ(j)t,k = Et
[
s
(i,j)
t+k − s(i,j)t
]
, (3.1)
where ξ
(•)
t,k is the k-period interest rate in country • = i, j, and s(i,j)t+k − s(i,j)t is the
k-period change of the log spot exchange rate, i.e. the price of currency i per units
of currency j. The expectation operator Et conditions on all information available in
time t. Furthermore, let pi
(•)
t,k denote the inflation rate in country • = i, j prevailing
from period t to t + k and define the ex-ante RIR as Etr
(•)
t,k = ξ
(•)
t,k − Etpi(•)t,k (Fisher
1930). By virtue of ex-ante relative PPP the right hand side expectation in (3.1)
obtains as Et
[
s
(i,j)
t+k − s(i,j)t
]
= Etpi
(i)
t,k − Etpi(j)t,k . Hence, UIP and ex-ante relative PPP
jointly imply the equality of ex-ante RIRs, i.e.
Etr
(i)
t,k = Etr
(j)
t,k . (3.2)
In related studies, RIRs are obtained by subtracting ex-ante inflation from nominal in-
terest rates. Accordingly, RIR approximations are implicitly subject to two additional
sources of uncertainty, namely the determination of expectations and the disregard
of inflation risk premia. In this study, ex-ante RIRs r
(•)
t,k , • = i, j are market quotes
of ten year (i.e. k = 120 months) real TIPS yields. Indexed TIPS offer a real future
income stream that is known at the date of the bond’s purchase.7 Thus, observed
yields reflect ex-ante interest rates in terms of fixed and known future purchasing
power. With observed quotes Etrt,k, the investigation of (3.2) does not suffer from
weak measurement of long run inflation expectations, systematic inflation expectation
errors or omitted inflation risk premia. Under capital market integration, real TIPS
yields equalize if agents believe that, until maturity, realized inflation differentials will
materialize in exchange rate changes.
Allowing for transitory deviations from ex-ante relative PPP and UIP obtains
r
(i)
t,k − r(j)t,k = et, (3.3)
6In this chapter, we will use superscripts to indicate cross sectional members to avoid clumsy
notation.
7Indexation of TIPS is subject to a small time lag (typically three months). According to the
empirical evidence in Evans (1998), it is unlikely that this source of nominal exposure affects
market prices.
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where et ∼ (0, σ2t ) follows a stationary process with unconditional mean of zero and
heteroskedastic innovations. Though equation (3.2) implies full convergence of RIRs
many authors consider international credit markets as integrated under less restric-
tive conditions. For instance, Mishkin (1984) notes that one should not only address
if a rejection of the RIP is statistically significant, but also if it is economically sig-
nificant. Moreover, Goodwin et al. (1994) argue that, in presence of transaction
costs or non-traded goods, RIRs differ across integrated capital markets. Lastly, a
process of capital market integration might imply that conceptually non-stationary
RIDs are characterized by systematic drift patterns that reflect a steady diminishing
of differentials over time.8
3.2.2 Hypotheses
In this section we briefly state the hypotheses and sketch the implications for testing.
As a starting point, consider a generalization of the model in (3.3),
r
(i)
t,k − r(j)t,k = c+ d1t + d2t2 + et, et ∼ (0, σ2t ). (3.4)
With reference to (3.4) the following hypotheses formalize distinct degrees of capital
market integration.
1. The RIP holds in its strong form (H1):
Capital market integration implies that the law of one price holds internationally.
Hence, expected real returns should be equal in equilibrium, i.e. c = d1 = d2 =
0.
2. The RIP holds in a weak form (H2):
In an integrated capital market, RIRs do not equalize in presence of transaction
costs or non-traded goods. Moreover, the factual characteristics of the TIPS
used to extract ex-ante RIRs are very similar across markets, but not identical.
RIR convergence up to a (small) nonzero intercept, i.e. c 6= 0, d1, d2 = 0,
indicates capital market integration which is in line with such stable frictions.
In contrast, large persistent deviations from parity could indicate substantial
currency risk premia that are at odds with market integration. As a decision
rule, weak market integration is rejected if stationary RIDs exhibit risk premia
8We thank an anonymous referee for this remark.
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that appear economically meaningful. We reject H2 if a significant estimate cˆ
exceeds 0.25 percentage points.9
3. Convergence via structural change (H3):
The continuous process of liberalization or a general decline in home biases
might imply gradually shrinking RIDs. Respective adjustment patterns could
be formalized in (3.4) by means of a deterministic trend that tends to vanish
over time. With an initially positive (negative) RID, this would formally imply
trend stationarity of RIDs and d1 < 0 and d2 ≥ 0 (d1 > 0 and d2 ≤ 0).
3.2.3 Methodology
To test hypotheses H1, H2 or H3 for a subsystem of the G7 we address the stationar-
ity of selected RIDs. Since the convergence of CA-FR or CA-UK RIRs likely reflects
their individual convergence to the US RIR, we confine the analysis to markets CA-
US, UK-FR, FR-US and UK-US. Furthermore, H1 and H2 are investigated by means
of bivariate cointegration tests. Building upon the results from pairwise market com-
parisons, finally, we test H1 in the four dimensional system.
Testing significance of risk premia and convergence via structural change (H3),
notably, t-ratios of deterministic terms in ADF regressions follow distinct distributions
if the considered process is integrated or not. Hence, respective significance tests rely
on either Gaussian critical values (under stationarity) or their simulated counterparts
(under the unit root hypothesis). However, as detailed in the empirical analysis, all
main conclusions on capital market integration hold under common Gaussian critical
values. To further enhance the reliability of inference, the empirical analysis takes
into account that RIR innovations are heteroskedastic. In a couple of papers Cavaliere
and coauthors (Cavaliere and Taylor 2007, 2008; Cavaliere, Rahbek and Taylor 2008)
showed that neglecting non-stationary volatility can disturb the size features of widely
applied unit root and cointegration diagnostics. Therefore, we derive p-values for
respective test statistics by means of the wild bootstrap approach outlined in the
aforementioned references. All main conclusions on (co)integration features are also
supported by conventional inference.
9Note that cˆ > 0.25 is interpreted as economically meaningful since it is the smallest unit at which
central banks change their target interest rates.
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Unit root tests
To infer on Hq, q = 1, 2, 3, consider the ADF type regression (Dickey and Fuller 1979)
∆y
(s)
t = γ+ δ1t+ δ2t
2+φy
(s)
t−1+λ1∆y
(s)
t−1+ . . .+λp∆y
(s)
t−p+u
(s)
t , ut
i.i.d∼ (0, σ2t ). (3.5)
For country pair s, the RID is y
(s)
t = r
(i)
t,k−r(j)t,k , {i, j} ∈ {CA,US; UK,FR; FR,US; UK,US}.
Testing the strong RIP (H1), deterministic terms are excluded from (3.5) to achieve
maximum power. We diagnose H1 if the RID is stationary around zero (φ < 0).
The weak RIP (H2) is diagnosed if the RID is stationary around a significant (but
small) intercept estimate (φ < 0, γ 6= 0). On the condition that neither H1 nor H2
are empirically supported, H3 is diagnosed if scenarios (φ < 0, δ1 < 0, δ2 ≥ 0) or
(φ < 0, δ1 > 0, δ2 ≤ 0) conform with the data rather than (φ = 0).
Cointegration tests
In contrast to unit root tests, cointegration tests address a necessary condition for the
international convergence of RIRs. In case of cointegration, one can subsequently test
if the diagnosed long run relations are consistent with the RIP. Compared with unit
root diagnostics cointegration methodology offers at least two benefits. Firstly, max-
imum likelihood based inference promises efficiency gains. Secondly, full dimensional
modeling provides one further rank condition which is necessary (though not suffi-
cient) for capital market integration. For simplicity of exposition consider a purely
stochastic VECM representation
∆Yt = ΠYt−1 + Γ1∆Yt−1 + . . .+ Γp∆Yt−p + εt, εt ∼ N(0,Σt), (3.6)
where Yt denotes a N -dimensional vector of non-stationary RIRs and Γ1, . . . ,Γp are
N×N parameter matrices. Multivariate normality with time homogeneous covariance
Σ is commonly assumed for maximum likelihood estimation. If the N ×N coefficient
matrix Π has a reduced rank, Rank(Π) = g < N , there exist N×g parameter matrices
α and β such that Π = αβ ′ and β ′Yt−1 formalizes g stationary equilibrium relationships
among country specific RIRs. Critical values for trace statistics (Johansen 1991) are
determined by means of resampling (Cavaliere, Rahbek and Taylor 2008).
Bivariate cointegration analysis, N = 2, is performed for RIR tuples Yt = Y
(s)
t =
(r
(i)
t,k, r
(j)
t,k )
′, where {i, j} ∈ {CA,US; UK,FR; FR,US; UK,US}. In this context two capi-
tal markets are integrated in the strong form (H1) if RIRs share a common stochastic
trend (g = 1), and the cointegrating parameters conform with a long run parity
34
Chapter 3 Capital market integration
(β ′ = (1,−1)). The weak form of integration (H2) prevails if, in addition, a signifi-
cant intercept of less than 0.25 percentage points enters the parity. Under full capital
market integration the system of non-stationary RIRs, N = 4, is driven by one global
stochastic trend. Accordingly, the cointegration rank is g = 3, and overidentifying
restrictions formalize CA-US, FR-US and UK-US parities.
3.3 Convergence characteristics of ex-ante RIRs
The empirical analysis comprises three steps. After introducing the data, we conduct
ADF tests for RIDs under alternative scenarios of RIR convergence (H1, H2 and H3).
Then, pairwise cointegration tests for RIRs are discussed and parameter restrictions
implied by H1 and H2 are tested. Finally, we turn to the full system and test for joint
(i.e. ’global’) capital market integration H1. If not stated explicitly the discussion of
diagnostic results refers to a nominal 5% significance level.
3.3.1 Data and preliminary analysis
We analyze market quotes for CA, FR, UK and US real TIPS yields. The analysis
is based on an update of the Herwartz and Roestel (2009) dataset used to investi-
gate the international dependence of breakeven inflation rates. Taking liquidity of
indexed long term government debt into account, ten year constant maturity RIRs
are drawn whenever possible.10 The Canadian RIR is approximated by means of the
real government benchmark bond yield which refers to higher maturities. The Cana-
dian government only issues real bonds that have a 30 year maturity. To examine
CA-US capital market integration we contrast Canadian real benchmark bond yields
to comparable US real benchmark bond yields constructed from 2029 and 2032 US
TIPS. Further details on the data sources are given in Table 5.1 and associated RIRs
are displayed in Figure 3.1. Visual inspection of the upper four panels of Figure 3.1
reveals a downward trend in RIRs that accords with the easing of monetary pol-
icy in response to the 2001 recession and the subsequent bond market ’Conundrum’
(Greenspan 2004).11
10From an economic perspective, 30 year interest rates should be used since, at this time horizon,
relative PPP appears to be a reasonable assumption (Taylor and Taylor 2004). However, evidence
in Section 3.4 suggests that, with respect to detecting long run convergence of RIRs, data quality
is more crucial than maturity issues. Therefore we keep the adverse impacts of liquidity risks
as small as possible rather than choosing assets with maturities that are fully consistent with
empirical evidence on relative PPP.
11The ’Conundrum’ has been associated with a general decline in term premia (Backus and Wright
2007).
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Figure 3.1: Real interest rates
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The upper four panels show long term ex-ante RIRs for CA, FR and the UK (solid) along
with potential benchmark rates (dotted). The lower two panels show US and FR TIPS
implied ex-ante RIRs with maturity k ≈ 120 months (solid) jointly with comparable con-
ventional benchmark RIR approximations r
(•)
t,120 = ξ
(•)
t,120 − Et[pi(•)t,120], where • ∈ {FR,US}
(dotted). Et[pi
(•)
t,120] is obtained from survey data.
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To further visualize linkages of local to world market RIRs, the upper four panels
of Figure 3.1 show RIRs in a pairwise manner. Obviously CA, FR and UK RIRs tend
to adjust to the RIRs of large partner economies, though spreads of either sign last
up to three years.
Descriptive statistics of associated RIDs in Table 5.1 hint at a rough coincidence of
CA-US and FR-US RIRs, since associated RIDs have unconditional means below 0.1%
in absolute value while their standard deviation is 0.38%. Comparing the descriptive
characteristics of observable long term RIDs and approximated long term differentials
in Fujii and Chinn (2001), the former appear smaller with respect to their range and
first order moments.
Table 3.1: Data
Type and source
CA real l-term Datastream (CNBBRLT)
FR OATI 2009, 2017, 2029 L’Agence France Tre´sor
UK 10y real Datastream (UKGR10Y)
US TIPS 2009, 2011, 2012, 2030, 2032 Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis
US 10y real Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis
Descriptive statistics
RIRs RIDs
CA FR UK US CA-US UK-FR FR-US UK-US
2.544
0.806
2.298
0.819
1.834
0.467
2.392
0.805
Mean
S.D.
−0.021
0.377
−0.455
0.549
−0.093
0.381
−0.558
0.577
1.480
4.040
0.950
3.850
0.700
2.580
1.090
4.403
Min.
Max.
−0.630
0.760
−1.822
0.610
−0.862
0.714
−2.293
0.310
Notes: The upper panel documents TIPS and constant 10 year constant maturity RIRs used
in this study. FR 10 year RIRs are approximated by linear interpolation of OATI 2009, 2017
and 2017, 2029 yields assuming a linear yield curve slope. Quotes on US constant maturity
10 year RIRs are available since 2003. Before, we approximate 10 year US interest rates by
using 2009, 2011 and 2012 US TIPS yields. Moreover, the CA-US subsystem is investigated
with the real yield of CA long term benchmark treasury bonds and US benchmark bond
yields with a comparable maturity obtained from 2030 and 2032 TIPS. In the lower panel,
the left (right) hand side documents descriptive statistics for RIRs (RIDs). S.D. is short for
the empirical standard deviation.
Before 2003, the UK RIR is mostly lower than its French and US counterparts which
might reflect temporary liquidity risk premia raised on TIPS markets other than
UK. Findings in Shen (2006), Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and Wright (2010) or Herwartz and
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Roestel (2009) suggest liquidity risk premia to affect CA and US real yields before
2003. Notably, before 2003, the TIPS market volume in CA, FR or the US was
lower than in the UK. Notwithstanding these technical features, the UK RIR seems
to systematically adjust to the parity with the US rate.
Eventual liquidity risk premia12 may complicate the analysis of RIR convergence.
To illustrate the approximation accuracy of TIPS yields, the lower panels of Figure
3.1 display ten year FR and US real TIPS yields against corresponding RIR approx-
imations obtained by subtracting survey based expected ten year inflation from ten
year nominal interest.13 Pointing to liquidity risk premia, US real TIPS yields exceed
their conventional counterparts until 2003 while approximated and observed FR RIRs
appear very similar throughout. After 2003, FR real TIPS yields tend to be slightly
below their counterparts which implies that liquidity risk premia are close to zero
under low inflation risk in FR. We conclude that liquidity risk premia are most likely
transitory and, hence, should not severely bias inference under full convergence of
RIRs. Moreover, as a consequence of non-synchronous risk patterns, potential premia
are more likely to bias inference towards the hypothesis of market segregation.
Economic theory postulates that RIRs are determined by the marginal product
of capital, and, hence, should be stationary around a positive constant. However,
stochastic trending is formally confirmed by the ADF diagnostics in the left panel of
Table 3.2. Since intercept estimates are insignificant throughout, we conclude that
observed trending patterns do not reflect systematic drifts.
3.3.2 Stationarity of RIDs
Table 3.3 documents unit root test of RIDs. Particular test designs formalize i) con-
vergence to zero, ii) convergence to a nonzero mean, and iii) gradual diminishing of
RIDs. Explicitly testing for stationarity around zero, the strong RIP (H1) is confirmed
for all RIDs, i.e. CA-US (with 10% significance), UK-FR, FR-US and UK-US. Gener-
alizing the test regressions by means of intercept terms does not indicate significance
of the respective parameters. Hence, the data are well in line with the parsimonious
regression supporting market integration in the strong form. Lastly, trend stationarity
of RIDs as formalized by H3 is not supported since trend parameter estimates, δˆ1 and
δˆ2, are insignificant.
12We do not consider convergence properties of liquidity risk adjusted TIPS yields (Herwartz and
Roestel 2009), since the respective adjustment factors depend on approximated long run inflation
expectations.
13Arguably, this is one of the most precise ways to measure long run FR and US RIRs in conventional
terms. Comparable data on long term ex-ante inflation is not available for CA and the UK.
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Table 3.2: (Co)integration characteristics of RIRs
Integration Cointegration
ADF c H0 eigenv. trace
CA −1.460
(.421)
0.035
(.682)
g = 0 0.195 52.18∗
(.009)
FR −1.373
(.492)
0.025
(.793)
g ≤ 1 0.114 26.61∗
(.056)
UK −1.969
(.276)
0.137
(.343)
g ≤ 2 0.078 12.34∗
(.083)
US −2.240
(.141)
0.090
(.358)
g ≤ 3 0.023 2.738
(.199)
ADF statistics and the corresponding intercept estimates are given in the left panel. The
right panel documents trace test results for the four dimensional system of RIRs. Through-
out, heteroscedasticity consistent p−values (Cavaliere and Taylor 2007, Cavaliere, Rahbek
and Taylor 2008) are given in parentheses. In all ADF regressions, the selected lag length is
0 according to the SIC. The VECM is specified excluding deterministic terms in the cointe-
gration space as suggested by the SIC. A lag of order 2 is chosen since highly significant first
order autocorrelation prevailed for more parsimonious lag structures. For all test statistics,
’*’ signals significance at the 5% level according to standard (i.e. non bootstrap) critical
values.
An unreported cross check for stationarity of RIDs conducted for the 2004/1-2010/1
subperiod characterized by presumably sufficient market liquidity hints at H1 to pre-
vail for UK-FR, CA-US and FR-US (the latter with 10% significance), while H1 to H3
are not supported for the case of the UK-US RID. Moreover, excluding the financial
crisis from the sample (2000/1-2008/1) yields H1 to hold for UK-FR, FR-US (with 10
% significance) and UK-US. Notably, rejecting non-stationarity within the shortened
samples could be overly challenging under near integration. Empirical findings sug-
gest that RIDs are stationary around zero if measured in terms of real TIPS yields.
However, the adjustment is sluggish in general and unit root tests that include redun-
dant deterministic terms fail to reproduce results on stationarity obtained from more
restrictive designs.
3.3.3 Cointegration testing
We provide cointegration diagnostics for systems of RIRs testing H1 and H2.
14 First,
we check for cointegration among international RIRs. Then, we provide LR diag-
14Since univariate analysis did not indicate the existence of deterministic trends, trend terms are
excluded from the cointegration space.
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nostics to test if the estimated cointegration relationships are consistent with H1 or
H2.
Table 3.3: Bivariate diagnostics
ADF tests for RIDs Cointegration diagnostics for RIRs
CA-US UK-FR FR-US UK-US CA-US UK-FR FR-US UK-US
ADF(1) −1.860
(.069)
−2.369∗
(.005)
−2.294∗
(.043)
−2.919∗
(.002)
Tr(1) 13.41
∗
(.039)
13.71∗
(.042)
13.94∗
(.033)
13.62∗
(.031)
ADF(2) −1.860
(.267)
−2.477
(.109)
−2.306
(.227)
−3.111∗
(.021)
βˆ
(LR)
−0.918
(.127)
−0.799
(.365)
−0.891
(.100)
−0.847
(.297)
γˆE-3 −2.659
(.959)
−18.16
(.642)
−5.302
(.903)
−28.34
(.519)
– – – –
ADF(3) −2.412
(.620)
−3.270
(.215)
−2.373
(.592)
−2.555
(.546)
Tr(2) 21.55
∗
(.055)
18.52
(.082)
18.14
(.075)
18.54
(.087)
γˆ 0.034
(.564)
−0.277∗
(.044)
0.028
(.623)
−0.097
(.551)
βˆ
(LR)
−1.344
(.244)
−0.399
(.029)
−1.166
(.446)
−2.119
(.516)
δˆ1E-4 3.803
(.929)
−82.16∗
(.170)
−11.49
(.729)
26.41
(.682)
cˆ 1.305
(.028)
−0.827
(.002)
0.633
(.124)
2.581
(.077)
δˆ2E-5 −0.288
(.944)
−6.029∗
(.242)
0.775
(.790)
−2.181
(.647)
c˜ 0.218
(.074)
0.172
(.459)
0.272
(.026)
0.337
(.070)
Lag 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0
The left hand side panel provides ADF statistics (heteroscedasticity consistent p-values,
Cavaliere and Taylor, 2007) for RIDs. Three alternative test specifications are considered,
namely without deterministic terms (ADF(1)), including a constant γˆ (ADF(2)), and a con-
stant and a time trend δˆ1, δˆ2 (ADF(3)). The lag selection criterion is the SIC. ’*’ signals
significance at the 5% level according to standard (non bootstrap) critical values. The right
hand side panel documents cointegration diagnostics (trace statistic, ’Tr’, and LR test of
the parity null hypothesis) for bivariate RIR vectors. The unrestricted cointegrating pa-
rameter is denoted βˆ, For trace statistics, heteroscedasticity consistent p-values (Cavaliere
et al. 2008) are given in parentheses and ’*’ signals significance at the 5% level according to
standard critical values. Two alternative test specifications are considered, a cointegrating
equation without deterministic terms (upper panel) and a specification with a constant in
the long run equilibrium (lower panel). Intercept estimates cˆ (c˜) are obtained from unre-
stricted and restricted (β = 1) estimates, respectively. Lag selection is according to the SIC.
If autocorrelation prevails, we choose the most parsimonious specification for which an LM
diagnostic indicates absence of serial correlation.
First consider the set of bivariate VECMs (N = 2). As documented in Table 3.3,
results for bivariate cointegration tests with zero intercept are generally in line with
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ADF diagnostics. Bivariate cointegration relationships are diagnosed for all consid-
ered capital market pairs, and restrictions implied by H1 are not rejected. Allowing
for a non-zero intercept in the cointegration relation hardly changes the evidence for
strong capital market integration. Bivariate cointegration among CA-US, UK-FR,
FR-US and UK-US RIRs receives support at the 10% level. Intercept estimates are
insignificant for the Northern American, Anglo American and the European subsys-
tems and parameter restrictions cannot be rejected for CA-US, FR-US and UK-US
RIRs. A small but significant intercept seems to prevail in the FR-US subsystem. As
a potential reflection of sampling uncertainty, the parity among cointegrated UK-FR
RIRs is rejected, which is at odds with the joint insignificance of respective restrictions
applied to FR-US and UK-US RIRs. Thus, full convergence of real capital market
rates, H1, likely holds for the subsystems CA-US, UK-FR
15 and UK-US while the FR-
US market might be better characterized by H2. Interestingly, testing implications of
ex-ante relative PPP, Bhatti and Moosa (1994) find strongest evidence against goods
market integration for this particular market pair within a cross section of ten OECD
economies.
In order to test if there is one ’global’ capital market, we perform a full dimensional
analysis (N = 4). According to the SIC, we do not include an intercept in the coin-
tegrating relations. Two lags are necessary to remove significant first order residual
autocorrelation. Trace statistics given in the right hand side of Table 3.2 indicate the
existence of g = 3 cointegration relationships with 10% significance. Economically,
g = 3 holds if all RIRs are subject to the capital market of one major (global) econ-
omy, the US, say. Noting that evidence on bivariate cointegration also suggests g = 3,
system features are discussed for the global trend model. For space considerations,
Table 3.4 shows estimation results only for the overidentified VECM specification that
incorporates the restrictions implied by H1. Moreover, to improve the informational
content of estimated error correction (EC) dynamics, insignificant EC coefficients have
been sequentially set to zero. Presuming three cointegrating relationships and testing
long run parities CA-US, FR-US and UK-US, the hypothesis of globalized markets
accords with the data (p−value: 0.18). Most estimated EC coefficients have reason-
able signs in the sense that deviations from the RIP are transitory. RIRs in CA,
FR and the UK tend to close deviations from the US rate significantly. In general,
the estimated adjustment speeds imply that eventual deviations have a half-life of
approximately one year. Moreover, Canadian and UK RIRs respond to violations of
15Since the UK-FR intercept term is estimated insignificant, we refer to the LR-statistic obtained
in the parsimonious cointegration model.
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the FR-US parity. To understand this result one might argue that if US assets lose
global attraction, investors redirect their capital in favor of (similar) Anglo-American
opportunities. US RIRs do not significantly adjust to deviations from parity relation-
ships. Hence, the long term US RIR is diagnosed weakly exogeneous and therefore
dominant in the long run. This result underpins US dominance and supports former
evidence for estimated ex-ante RIRs (Al-Awad and Goodwin 1998).
Table 3.4: VECM estimates
Cointegration parameters and error correction dynamics
rCA rFR rUK rUS ∆rCA ∆rFR ∆rUK ∆rUS
CI1 1 – – −1 EC1 −0.070
(.003)
– – –
CI2 – 1 – −1 EC2 0.059
(.011)
−0.052
(.014)
0.045
(.044)
–
CI3 – – 1 −1 EC3 – – −0.048
(.000)
–
Short term dynamics
∆rCA ∆rFR ∆rUK ∆rUS ∆rCA ∆rFR ∆rUK ∆US
CA(1) −0.243
(.044)
−0.150
(.216)
−0.005
(.979)
−0.367
(0.042)
CA(2) −0.039
(.742)
−0.268
(.026)
−0.255
(.200)
−0.256
(.154)
FR(1) 0.165
(.254)
−0.051
(.725)
−0.008
(.974)
−0.230
(.288)
FR(2) −0.099
(.511)
0.068
(.654)
−0.004
(.988)
0.113
(.623)
UK(1) 0.030
(.709)
0.006
(.937)
−0.188
(.160)
0.048
(.691)
UK(2) −0.002
(.984)
−0.061
(.441)
−0.261
(.047)
−0.136
(.251)
US(1) 0.141
(.226)
0.147
(.207)
0.222
(.254)
0.412
(.018)
US(2) 0.028
(.814)
−0.100
(.410)
0.259
(.187)
−0.039
(.823)
VECM parameter estimates for RIR systems and cointegration rank g = 3. The sys-
tem is estimated excluding deterministic terms according to the SIC. Initially insignifi-
cant EC coefficients are restricted to zero, p-values are given in parentheses. Particular
columns correspond to dependent variables, while rows indicate (lagged) explanatory
variables and EC coefficient estimates. The LR statistic for testing overidentifying
restrictions (p-values) implied by long run CA-US, FR-US and UK-US parities is
4.839 (.184). System residual diagnostics (p−values) are: White heteroscedasticity
test (.000), Jarque-Bera test for normality (.000), LM test against first order serial
correlation (.611).
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3.4 A note on evidence in related studies
One may argue that previous investigations of RIR convergence are subject to a
trade-off between data quality and maturity: On the one hand, the central building
blocks of the RIP, namely the UIP and the ex-ante relative PPP, hardly hold for short
term horizons. As RIRs are typically obtained by subtracting realized inflation from
short term interest rates (e.g. Goodwin and Grennes 1994, Chinn and Frankel 1995,
Ferrera and Ledesma 2007), this caveat applies to most studies. On the other hand,
RIR approximation accuracy strongly decreases at higher maturities due to inflation
risk premia and imprecise measures of expected long run inflation. Since quotes
on survey-based long run inflation expectations are rare, inflation compensation of
long run nominal interest rates has been approximated by means of ten year realized
forward inflation (Fujii and Chinn 2001), one year realized forward inflation (Obstfeld
and Shambaugh 2002) or model based inflation forecasts (Fujii and Chinn 2001, Al-
Awad and Goodwin 1998). Arguably, all these statistics are more likely subject to
systematic biases than corresponding short run measures.
While evidence at hand suggests that the RIP holds if RIRs are measured in terms
of real TIPS yields, related studies tend to reject the RIP. To investigate if this dis-
crepancy reflects maturity or measurement issues we conduct ADF tests for RIDs cal-
culated from distinct short and long run RIR measures. Evidence for non-stationarity
of approximated short term (long term) RIDs is seen to support the suggestion that
the maturity (measurement) issue is of particular importance. Lastly, overall conver-
gence for all alternative RID measures is seen to indicate that market integration has
increased in the most recent decade. We approximate RIRs in three alternative ways.
1. Firstly, short term RIRs are obtained by subtracting the three month forward
consumer price inflation (CPI) rate from the three month nominal interest rate,
i.e.
r
(i)
t,3 = ξ
(i)
t,3 − pi(i)t,3, (3.7)
where pi
(i)
t,3 = lnCPI
(i)
t+3−ln CPI(i)t−9. Given moderate inflation and price stickiness,
inflation expectation errors and potential premia for inflation risk should be
small for an investment horizon of three months, say.
2. Secondly, long term RIRs are obtained by subtracting survey based measures of
expected inflation from long run nominal interest rates. In particular, CA-US,
UK-FR and UK-US RIDs are derived from RIRs
r
(i)
t,120 ≈ ξ(i)t,120 −Etpi(i)t,12, (3.8)
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where ξ
(i)
t,120 is the ten year nominal interest rate and Etpi
(i)
t,12 is the inflation rate
expected to prevail during the next year. Since survey based expected long run
inflation rates are available for the European Monetary Union (i.e. FR) and the
US, we investigate FR-US market integration by means of long term RIRs
r
(i)
t,120 ≈ ξ(i)t,120 − Etpi(i)t,120, (3.9)
where Etpi
(i)
t,120 are survey based ten year inflation expectations.
16 Notably,
quotes on expected inflation for CA, FR and the UK are only available at the
quarterly frequency. Thus, empirical results on convergence of approximated
RIRs building on survey based ex-ante inflation are obtained from quarterly
data for the period 2000q1 to 2009q4 which is suppressed in the notation to
avoid confusion.
3. Lastly, long term RIRs are obtained in the spirit of Fujii and Chinn (2001).
However, subtracting ex-post ten year future inflation from ten year nominal
interest is not feasible for our sample period 2000/1 − 2010/1. Therefore, the
long run steady state of inflation is determined by means of HP filtering (Hodrick
and Prescott 1997). Formally, respective RIRs read as
r
(i)
t,120 ≈ ξ(i)t,120 − p˜i(i)t , (3.10)
where ξ
(i)
t,120 is the ten year nominal interest rate and p˜i
(i)
t is the HP implied
steady state of realized CPI inflation pi
(i)
t in month t.
ADF test results for the three alternative RID measures are shown in Table 4.4.
In line with the mixed evidence on market integration in related studies, our findings
appear inconclusive when RIRs are measured conventionally. Short term RIDs are
diagnosed stationary around zero for CA-US and UK-FR, while FR-US and UK-US
RIDs are found to be non-stationary. In turn, ADF tests for differentials between ap-
proximated high maturity RIRs according to (3.8) and (3.9) indicate UK-US station-
arity around an economically significant risk premium while full convergence might
only hold for the FR-US RID. Furthermore, defining RIRs according to (3.10), we
diagnose H1 and H2 for the UK-FR and CA-US markets with 10% significance, re-
spectively. Hence, under weak approximation accuracy of RIRs or using short term
16US survey based expectations refer to ten years ahead, while EMU expectations refer to five years
only. Noting that EMU survey based expectations hardly show any variation, one may assume
that five and ten year EMU expected inflation rates coincide.
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variables, empirical tests might fail to confirm a de-facto state of capital market inte-
gration. In particular the weak approximation of RIRs seems to pose a more severe
problem for inference since full convergence holds for some short term RIDs, and for
the survey based long term FR-US RID given in (3.9).
3.5 Concluding remarks
We investigate capital market integration as implied by the convergence of observed
ex-ante long term TIPS yields for the period 2000/1-2010/1 and markets CA, FR, the
UK and the US. Unit root analysis suggests that all RIDs are stationary around zero.
Evidence from bivariate cointegration testing points at the prevalence of cointegration
for all markets. Moreover, observed cointegration patterns cannot be rejected to reflect
pairwise integration of CA-US, UK-FR, FR-US and UK-US capital markets. Full
dimensional cointegration analysis suggests that all RIRs are individually linked to
the US counterpart. Tests of overidentifying parameter restrictions formally confirm
the integration of CA, FR, UK and US capital markets. Moreover, though a growing
financial influence of the European economies has been highlighted in Ehrmann and
Fratzscher (2004), estimated adjustment dynamics suggest that the (global) cost of
capital is determined in the US. Addressing the mixed evidence on the RIP in related
studies, we show that, for the same time period, real money market rates or (weakly)
approximated long term RIRs hardly converge. Hence, the failure of short run ex-ante
relative PPP and short run UIP, and presumably weak approximations of long term
RIRs might have favored empirical rejections of full capital mobility in former studies.
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Monetary Independence I: Interest
Rate Autonomy
4.1 Motivation
The macroeconomic trilemma (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2005) suggests that
the openness of capital markets and the flexibility of FX rates jointly determine the
extent to which small economies are able to isolate domestic interest rates from world
interest rates. For small open economies, achieving a certain degree of autonomy over
domestic interest rates is only possible by accepting some loss of control over domestic
exchange rates and vice versa. Monetary dependence matters for small open economies
that stabilize their FX rates to currencies of larger partner countries by means of FX
market interventions. It further matters for economies that are subject to the notion
of ’Fear of Floating’ (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). These formally ’floating’ economies
tend to follow world market interest rate movements to prevent strong adjustments
of exchange rates. In both cases, however, the autonomy over domestic interest rates
is determined by the extent of FX flexibility that monetary authorities are willing
to tolerate. Hence, every small open economy that allocates nonzero weight to some
FX rate target has to accept some loss of control over domestic interest rates. The
possibility to choose among a number of distinct domestic policy strategies is the
lead argument to allow for a floating currency (Calvo and Mishkin, 2003). In this
respect, a comprehensive empirical assessment of this trade-off is important for a
sensible evaluation if (and to what extent) a given economy should stabilize FX rates.
Recent empirical evidence casts doubt if actual gains in monetary independence are
substantial. Frankel, Schmukler and Serven (2004) suggest that, similar to pegs, full
transmission of global interest rates also holds for free floating regimes, at least in
the long run. According to Frankel et al. (2004), only three economies were able
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to set their own interest rates over the 1990s, namely Germany, Japan and the US.
Presuming that the decision to either pursue a peg or a nonpeg (i.e. to allow for
some variation in FX rates) factually matters for the monetary independence of small
economies, Shambaugh (2004) and Obstfeld et al. (2005) find interest rates of pegs
to follow the base countries’ rates closer in comparison with nonpegs.
The issue of monetary independence has been investigated by means of rather re-
strictive econometric models. The conventional approach is conditional on a highly
stylized classification with respect to an observed or declared status of FX rate flexi-
bility. Then, assuming parameter homogeneity within class specific subsamples, (un-
balanced) pooled panel regression models for interest rate transmission are estimated.
Available empirical evidence might suffer from the following shortcomings. Firstly, a
conventional de facto classification of exchange rate flexibility such as pegs vs. non-
pegs (Shambaugh 2004, Obstfeld et al. 2005) could be too restrictive. Moreover, the
assumption of parameter homogeneity within rather general groups is likely violated
and might lead to biased panel estimates. In fact, many economies do neither pursue
pure pegs nor pure floats (Fischer 2001, Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2005) and these poli-
cies may also continuously change over time. To assess the macroeconomic trilemma,
one should fully exploit the apparent time and country specific heterogeneity that
prevails in the data, rather than relying on restrictive pooled panel regressions. More-
over, a lack of selectivity among country specific policy options with regard to FX
flexibility limits the scope of empirical results for monetary policy advice. Secondly,
former studies primarily focus on the impact of exchange rate stability on monetary
independence, while the joint impact of capital mobility and exchange rate flexibil-
ity has not been sufficiently highlighted yet. While Frankel et al. (2004) indirectly
consider capital mobility by modeling time specific subsamples, Shambaugh (2004)
provides estimates for interest rate transmission conditional on capital mobility (clas-
sified according to the existence and absence of capital barriers) and currency regime
type (peg vs. nonpeg). However, as a consequence of country specific currency risk
premia, capital mobility might substantially differ across economies with liberalized
capital markets, especially in case of nonpegs. Distinguishing between absence of
capital barriers and capital mobility might not be essential for a comparison of trans-
mission dynamics among (credible) pegs and nonpegs, but it matters for a comprehen-
sive, continuous assessment of the macroeconomic trilemma. For instance, consider
the case of economies following a reference countries’ interest rates to prevent fluctu-
ations of its exchange rate. For a given degree of FX rate variability, country specific
independence crucially depends on the extent of capital mobility, as it determines the
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strength of reactions of FX rates to unilateral interest rate changes. Hence, cross
correlation of interest rate changes should continuously increase with capital mobility
for all economies that attribute nonzero weight to FX targets. In a general model,
therefore, interest rate transmission should be evaluated conditional on a continuum
of representative states characterized by country specific factual FX flexibility and
capital mobility. Thirdly, comovements among international interest rates have been
assumed to reflect a loss of monetary autonomy in general, although the prevalence
of real business cycle linkages suggests that central banks could independently choose
a similar stance of monetary policy. Therefore, one should control for deviations from
potential targets of inflation or output in an empirical model. Lastly, an analysis
of monetary independence should be conducted within an uniform empirical model.
Respecting the latter premise is not trivial since international interest rates might
be characterized by heterogeneous (co)integration characteristics. To circumvent this
difficulty, Frankel et al. (2004), Shambaugh (2004) and Obstfeld et al. (2005) employ
an econometric approach suggested by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). This method-
ology allows for uniform model estimation irrespectively if the underlying variables
are I(0) or I(1). However, it somehow exchanges the problem of model choice against
the selection of critical values for inferential purposes which depend on assumptions
concerning the (uniform) integration order that characterizes the data.
To address these issues, the empirical model in this work is implemented in the
framework of flexible semiparametric functional coefficient models (Cai, Fan and Yao
2000, Herwartz and Xu, 2009). It allows interest rate transmission parameters to be
estimated as a (nonlinear) function of both the current state of measurable FX vari-
ability and capital mobility. Moreover, country specific domestic fundamentals such as
gaps of output, inflation and FX rates are included to identify if dependence of inter-
est rates is induced by international capital flows or reflects independent policy steps
under real economic linkages. Using a slightly modified concept of long run monetary
dependence, we allow the domestic interest rates to adjust to a flexible (i.e. local)
steady state obtained by Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering the interest rate differen-
tial.1 Since deviations from HP implied steady states are stationary by construction,
standard inferential tools apply irrespectively if cointegration features a system of
international interest rates or not. The considered panel comprises quarterly data for
20 developed economies collected after the great moderation period 1987Q1-2008Q2.
Assessing the full trade-off among FX stability, capital mobility and monetary au-
1With respect to the uncovered interest rate parity, the HP trend should reflect general differences
in inflation rates (implying a permanently expected change in the domestic FX rate) or persistent
premia for currency risk
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tonomy in a general model improves upon earlier studies since it allows to quantify the
presumed effects of any given reduction in country specific exchange rate flexibility on
monetary dependence. Since monetary authorities might not realize substantial gains
in independence when tolerating high variability in FX rates, this aspect is of natural
interest for policy advice. Moreover, monetary authorities might be interested in the
scope that is left for influencing domestic interest rates given the average extent of
FX volatility they are willing to accept.
To preview the empirical results of this work, we confirm the implications of the
trilemma to hold throughout. Monetary autonomy appears completely lost for economies
that feature low FX rate flexibility and high capital mobility, while economies with
rather immobile capital and flexible FX rates are least affected by interest rate trans-
mission. For the latter, however, transmission still appears to be quite high. Formally
testing the implications of the macroeconomic trilemma, we strongly reject invariance
of interest rate transmission with respect to capital mobility and FX rate flexibility for
all provided semiparametric model specifications. Notably, our results appear robust
to alternative measures of FX rate flexibility, capital market openness and long run
steady states among interest rates. Moreover, we provide evidence that ignoring the
impact of domestic fundamentals leads to upward biased estimates of interest rate
transmission especially for more flexible regimes. Thus, former evidence suggesting
that floating implies only moderate advantages in monetary independence might arise
from omitted variable biases.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the subsequent section,
we introduce our empirical model, which, in a first step, is estimated by means of
conventional parametric panel models allowing for fixed effects and country specific
interest rate rules. In section 4.3 we explain how the model is implemented in the
functional coefficient framework, motivate the employed state variables and provide
semiparametric estimation results. Furthermore, we discuss the findings and implica-
tions for monetary policy. Section 4.4 concludes. Technical details about estimation
and inference in semiparametric models, as well as several robustness checks are given
in the appendix.
4.2 Monetary independence - benchmark approaches
As a starting point, we formalize interest rate transmission in a conventional (para-
metric) framework to obtain a (descriptive) assessment of data inherent features that
allows a meaningful comparison with conclusions available from the literature. Firstly,
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the empirical model is introduced, followed by a brief description of the regime classi-
fication procedures applied to measures of FX variability and capital mobility. After
providing some information on the data set, parametric fixed effects panel regressions
for each regime are conducted and empirical (benchmark) results are discussed.
4.2.1 Single country regressions
The implications of FX stability on monetary dependence have been investigated by
comparing instantaneous transmission of interest rates across different FX regimes.
Frankel et al. (2004) use monthly interest rate levels and unbalanced panel models
with fixed effects, while Shambaugh (2004) considers first differences in yearly inter-
est rates and pooled model estimation instead. We generalize the panel model in
Shambaugh (2004) by additionally considering domestic fundamentals and a ’pseudo
error correction term’ that allows for long term adjustments to a time varying steady
state. In line with Shambaugh (2004), the analysis builds on lower frequency data to
minimize problems associated with heterogeneous time lags in short term adjustment
dynamics. For given presample values consider single country regression models of
the following form:
∆ξit= αi1∆ξjt + αi2(ξit−1 − ξjt−1 − φhpijt−1) + βi0 + βi1piit−1 + βi2y˜it−1 + βi3s˜ijt−1 + eit,
yit = x
′
itαi + z
′
itβi + eit, t = 1, . . . , T, i = 1, . . . , N, (4.1)
where the time and cross section dimension of the sample are denoted as T and N ,
respectively, x′it = [∆ξjt, (ξit−1 − ξjt−1 − φhpijt−1)] and z′it = [1, piit−1, y˜it−1, s˜ijt−1].
Specifically, ξit is the (quarterly) short term domestic market interest rate in country
i, φhpijt−1 is the steady state interest rate differential between country i and reference
country j obtained by HP filtering of the nominal interest rate differential ξit−1−ξjt−1.
For benchmarking purposes, we use either German or US interest rates, where the
German rate is the reference for all European countries (except Germany and the UK),
and the US rate is considered for all other economies (including Germany and the
UK). This choice reflects the commonly held view that most European interest rates
are predominantly subject to German interest rates, while the US monetary policy
tends to dominate world interest rates (Katsimbris and Miller, 1993, Kirchga¨ssner
and Wolters, 1993, Hassapis, Pittis and Prodromidis 1999). Turning to domestic
fundamentals, the deviations from the steady states of domestic inflation, output
and exchange rates are given by piit−1, y˜it−1 and s˜ijt−1. Throughout, HP implied
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steady states are recursively evaluated (and therefore ’observable’). 2 As suggested by
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) we use a smoothing parameter of λ = 1600 for quarterly
data. For exact definitions of the variables see table 5.1.
Obviously, the specification in (4.1) is similar to an error correction model restricted
to a long run interest rate parity that holds up to an additional time varying intercept
φhpijt−1 which is determined outside the model. In the framework of the uncovered in-
terest rate parity, φhpijt−1 should reflect steady states of i) expected FX rate changes as
e.g. implied by differences in (expected) inflation rates or ii) persistent risk premia.
We choose a flexible local steady state since risk premia and cross country spreads
in inflation expectations may trend in a persistent manner. Hence, imposing conven-
tional deterministic terms such as an intercept or a time trend to enter a cointegrating
relation might not be appropriate. Moreover, regression (4.1) is not subject to inferen-
tial issues associated with nonstationary (and eventually not cointegrated) variables,
since deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered interest rate differential are
stationary by construction. As a robustness check we also provide estimates of con-
ventional error correction dynamics in the appendix. Lastly, controlling for domestic
fundamentals such as the deviations from HP-implied steady states of inflation, out-
put and exchange rates in model (4.1) helps to rule out spurious evidence on monetary
dependence that could be induced by real economic linkages. HP filtering is neces-
sary since inflation rates and FX rates tend to be non-stationary. When considering
domestic fundamentals piit−1, y˜it−1 and s˜ijt−1, notably, we do not attempt to estimate
the ’true’ monetary policy reaction function for each country in the panel since this
appears hardly feasible. Our aim is rather to improve the estimation of interest rate
transmission compared with the case where effects of business cycle synchronization
remain unconsidered at all. According to the model in (4.1), monetary independence
implies that an economy is able to maintain isolated interest rate adjustments from a
given equilibrium interest rate differential (as it is implied by HP trends) to influence
output or inflation. Thus, the impact of international transmission (parameterized
by αi1 and αi2) on the domestic interest rate should be insignificant or at least small
in absolute terms. Moreover, the response of local interest rates to domestic inflation
and output (parameterized by βi1 and βi2 ) should be (significantly) positive whenever
central banks adopt monetary strategies in the spirit of the Taylor rule. A positive
parameter estimate βˆi3
3 might reflect that monetary authorities adjust domestic in-
terest rates in order to stabilize FX rates, and thus, their policy is not independent in
2To guarantee sensible HP gaps at the beginning of the sample (1987Q1) we use presample informa-
tion, i.e. a gap in t is derived by filtering data for the subperiod t∗, . . . , t, where t∗ << 1987Q1.
3Note that FX rates are defined in direct quotation.
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a stricter sense. In turn, loss of autonomy occurs if αi1 (or αi2) are estimated signifi-
cantly positive (negative) and large in absolute value. Moreover, under high exposure
to foreign interest rates, estimates of βi1, βi2 and βi3 might be insignificant since, in
such a setting, monetary authorities could fail to adjust interest rates with respect to
domestic goals. For our purposes, however, the main emphasis lies on transmission
parameters αi1 and αi2 since insignificance of βi1, βi1 and βi3 might also signal that
countries do not (try to) set domestic interest rates in response to deviations from
output, inflation or FX rate targets. Nevertheless, a brief discussion of associated
parameter estimates is provided for completeness. Partialling out zit from (4.1) yields
yˇit = xˇ
′
itαi + eˇit, (4.2)
where yˇi = Miyi, xˇi = Mixi, eˇi = Miei and Mi = (Ii − zi(z′izi)−1z′i), with zi =
[zi1, . . . , ziT ]
′. For panel estimation of equation (4.2), we allow that interest rate
transmission parameters α1 and α2 vary according to observable heterogeneity mea-
sured in terms of FX rate flexibility and capital market integration over countries i
and for time t. Different assumptions concerning the pattern of heterogeneity give rise
to both conventional panel regressions with fixed effects and country specific funda-
mentals (sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.4) as well as more flexible semiparametric functional
coefficient panel regressions (section 4.3).
4.2.2 State definitions and panel estimation
Let observable country specific FX variability ψ˜fxit and capital (im)mobility ψ˜
cap
it in
quarter t be approximated as
ψ˜fxit =
∑
m∈t−1
(∆ ln sij,m)
2 and ψ˜capit = (rit−1 − rjt−1)2, (4.3)
respectively, where sij,m is the monthly price for one unit of reference currency j in
terms of domestic currency i and rit−rjt is the quarterly real interest rate differential.
Specifically, rit = ξit − pieit is defined as the three month nominal interest rate ξit de-
flated by the three month expected rate of inflation pieit in time t. To avoid endogeneity
issues we throughout approximate pieit by annualized realized consumer price inflation,
pieit ≈ ln(CPIit) − ln(CPIit−4), implicitly assuming static instead of rational expecta-
tions. The FX rate regime in country i at time t is classified as relatively ’flexible’
(’inflexible’) if the current FX volatility is below (above) the corresponding global i.e.
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cross sectional median4, Med(ψ˜fxt ). Moreover, to capture potential strengthening of
capital market integration over time, it is distinguished if the capital mobility in time
t is below or above the country specific median reference level5, Med(ψ˜capi ). Formally,
we have
ψ˜fxit =
{
ψ˜fx,hit if ψ˜
fx
it ≥ Med(ψ˜fxt )
ψ˜fx,lit otherwise
and ψ˜capit =
{
ψ˜cap,hit if ψ˜
cap
it < Med(ψ˜
cap
i )
ψ˜cap,lit otherwise.
Following the panel approach of Shambaugh (2004), we conduct regime specific pooled
estimates of model (4.2) giving rise to the specification
yˇit = xˇ
′
itα+ it, ∀{i, t} ∈ (ψ˜cap,•, ψ˜fx,◦), (4.4)
where •, ◦ ∈ {l, h}. Panel model (4.4) implicitly includes country specific fixed effects
accounting e.g. for long term moderation processes. To benchmark our model with al-
ternative specifications that have been used earlier in this context, we complementary
apply a classification scheme similar to that in Shambaugh (2004), where a country i
in quarter t is labeled ’peg’ if its (monthly) exchange rate has been within 2% bands
over the last 12 months. To measure capital mobility, Shambaugh (2004) considered
(non)existence of capital barriers. Since capital markets had been liberalized over
the vast majority of ’small’ developed economies until 1987, we do not take capital
controls explicitly into account.
4.2.3 Data and variable definition
This study builds on quarterly cross sectional data for the time period 1987q1-2008q3
for 20 ’small’ economies, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The choice
is motivated by data availability. Outlying observations quoted in the context of
international crises (e.g. European currency crisis 1992/1993, the Asian financial crisis
1997) are excluded from the sample as well as quotes related to excessive interest rate
volatility. In particular, strong fluctuations in South Korean interest rates observed
before 1999 completely dominated sample information and therefore rendered panel
4It has been argued (Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2005) that FX volatility might not only reflect FX
flexibility, but also common exposure to shocks. It is noteworthy that defining FX volatility with
respect to a global volatility benchmark might reduce this effect to some extent.
5Note that an evaluation with respect to the cross sectional median of capital mobility Med(ψ˜capt )
would remove global time trends as e.g. implied by the process of financial globalization.
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coefficient estimates hardly representative. Interest rates are three month money
market rates, or, if not available, three month treasury bill rates. Spot FX rates are
throughout determined in direct quotation. To measure inflation we use annualized
CPI inflation. Annualized real growth of output is approximated by means of GDP
data whenever possible. If corresponding time series are not available, annualized
real growth of industrial production is used instead. Table 4.1 provides more detailed
information about data sources, variable definitions and removed observations.
Table 4.1: Variable definitions, data sources and removed observations
Variable Definition Source Removed Observations
ξit 3 Month MM/TB Rate IFS Bel 1992Q2-1993Q4
∗
piit, pi
e
it ln(CPIit)− ln(CPIit−4) IFS Den 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
yit ln(GDPit)− ln(GDPit−4)− piit Datastream FR 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
ln(IPit)− ln(IPit−4)− piit Datastream IT 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
sij Price currency i/ Price currency j Datastream Ko 1987Q1-1999Q1
+
rit ξit − piit - Nor 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
p˜iit piit −HP(piit, λ = 1600|It) - NZ 1987Q1-1988Q3+
y˜it yit −HP(yit, λ = 1600|It) - Swe 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
s˜ij,t sij,t −HP(sij,t, λ = 1600|It) - Fin 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
φhpij,t ξit − ξjt −HP(ξit − ξjt, λ = 1600|It) - Ir 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
Variable definitions and sources are given in the left panel of table 4.1. In particular,
the notion HP(yit, λ = 1600|It) refers to the HP implied trend of yit using a smoothing
parameter of λ = 1600 and only quotes on yit available until t. The right hand side panel
lists observations discarded from the estimation procedure. Time periods marked with ’∗’
denote exclusion due to unusual fluctuations in corresponding interest rates in the line of the
European currency crisis. Periods marked with ’+’ denote exclusion due to excess interest
rate volatility.
4.2.4 Results
Table 4.2 reports panel estimates for the model in equation (4.2) according to distinct
regimes of FX flexibility and capital mobility.
As implied by a parameter estimate of αˆ1 = 0.81, changes in world interest rates
∆ξjt are almost instantaneously reflected in interest rate changes of corresponding
partner economies given that exchange rate volatility is low (ψ˜fx,l) and capital mobility
is high (ψ˜cap,h). Integrated economies with low FX rate variation are therefore hardly
able to adapt domestic interest rates in response to their individual positions over
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the business cycle. Short run transmission to economies with low FX flexibility but
less mobile capital (ψ˜fx,l, ψ˜cap,l) is weaker (αˆ1 = 0.65). At a nominal level of 5%, we
do not diagnose significance of error correction dynamics αˆ2 for these two regimes.
Evidence in the subsequent chapter suggests considerable parameter heterogeneity
to prevail within both groups. Consequently, the parameter heterogeneity not taken
into account by this panel regressions appears to increase estimation uncertainty and
results in imprecise panel estimates.
Table 4.2: Panel estimates for model 4.2
All ψ˜fx,l, ψ˜cap,h ψ˜fx,l, ψ˜cap,l ψ˜fx,h, ψ˜cap,h ψ˜fx,h, ψ˜cap,l Peg Nonpeg
αˆ1 0.542
(11.50)
0.813
(11.95)
0.655
(9.11)
0.502
(7.28)
0.344
(3.55)
0.825
(14.69)
0.450
(8.16)
αˆ2 −0.025
(−1.06)
−0.051
(−1.00)
−0.111
(−1.63)
0.033
(1.41)
−0.072
(−1.55)
−0.134
(−2.11)
−0.024
(−0.91)
θˆ1 0.622
(13.30)
0.836
(14.08)
0.731
(9.84)
0.564
(7.45)
0.459
(4.49)
0.847
(15.70)
0.535
(9.27)
θˆ2 0.027
(1.12)
0.077
(2.13)
−0.071
(−1.21)
0.063
(2.93)
−0.006
(−0.12)
0.012
(0.23)
0.019
(0.75)
Parametric panel estimates for model yˇit = xˇ
′
itα+ it (upper part), as well as for the model
y?it = x
?
it
′θ + ˜it (lower part) where the impact of domestic policy rules is not taken into
account. Transmission parameter estimates are provided for the full sample as well as
for subsamples that are defined by capital mobility (ψ˜capit ) and FX rate volatility (ψ˜
fx
it ) in
country i and time t. The four different states are given by: ψ˜fx,hit ⇐⇒ ψ˜fxit ≥ Med(ψ˜fxt );
ψ˜
fx,l
it ⇐⇒ ψ˜fxit < Med(ψ˜fxt ); ψ˜cap,hit ⇐⇒ ψ˜capit < Med(ψ˜capi ) and ψ˜cap,lit ⇐⇒ ψ˜capit ≥ Med(ψ˜capi ).
t-statistics based on Newey-West standard errors are given in parentheses. Panel estimates
according to the classification in Shambaugh (2004) are given in the right panel. The
corresponding coefficient estimate θˆ1 for yearly data in Shambaugh (2004, p.325) is 0.79 for
pegs and 0.55 for nonpegs under absence of capital controls.
Economies characterized by higher variation of FX rates and rather mobile capital
(ψ˜fx,h, ψ˜cap,h) are less subject to international transmission of interest rate changes
(αˆ1 = 0.45) while adjustment dynamics αˆ2 towards the steady state equilibrium are
insignificant. Lastly, economies with low capital mobility and rather flexible FX rates
(ψ˜fx,h, ψ˜cap,l) are least affected by interest rate transmission (αˆ1 = 0.34).
Turning to estimates based on a similar classification as in Shambaugh (2004), pegs
are characterized by high transmission of interest rate changes αˆ1 = 0.83, while also
adjustment dynamics αˆ2 = −0.13 are negative with 5% significance. In contrast, con-
temporaneous transmission of nonpegs’ interest rate changes is weaker (αˆ1 = 0.45)
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and adjustment dynamics are insignificant. The counterpart estimates for αˆ1 in Sham-
baugh (2004, p.325) are 0.79 for pegs and 0.55 for nonpegs under absence of capital
controls. However, comparing this evidence to our results is only justified if observed
correlation of interest rates fully reflects monetary dependence. Therefore, it is of
immediate interest if an exclusion of control variables piit−1, y˜it−1 and s˜ijt−1 from (4.1)
yields (upward) biased estimates of monetary dependence especially for more flexi-
ble regimes under synchronized business cycles. To address this point, consider the
restricted panel model
∆ξ?it = θ1∆ξ
?
jt + θ2(ξit−1 − ξjt−1 − φhpijt−1)? + e˜it,
=ˆ y?it = x
?
it
′θ + e˜it, ∀{i, t} ∈ (ψ˜cap,•, ψ˜fx,◦), (4.5)
where e.g. y?it ≡ yit − y¯i with y¯i denoting the sample mean of yit. Table 4.2 pro-
vides regime specific estimates for panel model (4.5). Overall, ignoring the impact of
domestic fundamentals appears to have two distinct effects. On the one hand inter-
est rate transmission seems strongly upward biased for economies that are presumed
most independent (ψ˜fx,h, ψ˜cap,l or ’nonpegs’), since estimates θˆ1 exceed corresponding
quantities αˆ1 up to θˆ1 − αˆ1 = 0.11. In turn, there is hardly any difference between θˆ1
and αˆ1 for economies that should suffer from loss of monetary autonomy (ψ˜
fx,l, ψ˜cap,h
or ’pegs’). These findings underline the argument that interest rates of (presum-
ably) more independent economies should ceteris paribus incorporate more informa-
tion about domestic fundamentals. Interestingly, estimated interest rate transmission
obtained under absence of control variables for the group of nonpegs (θˆ1 = 0.54) is
very close to the corresponding estimate of 0.55 in Shambaugh (2004). This might be
a hint that the lack of control variables in former studies implies an understatement of
independence especially for more flexible FX regimes. On the other hand, somewhat
’odd’ parameter estimates θˆ2 are more reasonable after controlling for domestic fun-
damentals. As already suspected by Frankel et al. (2004) and Shambaugh (2004), our
empirical findings support an economically significant share of common movements
in interest rates to reflect synchronized business cycle behavior. Thus, evaluating
monetary dependence merely in terms of interest rate comovement might not be fully
appropriate. Moreover, the ”Fear of Floating” phenomenon implying comovements in
interest rates under de jure flexible FX rates could be less relevant if one adequately
controls for domestic fundamentals and real economic linkages.
Unconditional (i.e. state invariant) estimates of interest rate response to domestic
fundamentals obtained from the regression in (4.1) are given in table 4.3. In line with
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the monetary independence of Germany and Japan that is postulated in Frankel et al.
(2004), associated interest rates significantly respond to domestic gaps of output and
inflation. Moreover, there is also evidence that interest rates of some smaller countries
characterized by high FX flexibility (New Zealand) or even intermediate to low FX
variation (Netherlands and Switzerland) might react to domestic fundamentals.
Table 4.3: Response to domestic fundamentals: Parameter estimates for single
countries
Aus Aut Be Ca Den Fin Fr Ger It Ir
βˆ2 0.120
(1.72)
−0.085
(−1.44)
0.071
(1.15)
0.009
(0.11)
0.048
(0.41)
−0.022
(−0.23)
0.098
(1.66)
0.337
(7.34)
−0.105
(−2.44)
0.019
(0.25)
βˆ3 0.088
(1.71)
0.042
(1.66)
0.002
(0.33)
0.031
(0.98)
0.006
(0.57)
0.038
(1.16)
0.092
(1.90)
0.042
(5.23)
0.036
(1.56)
−0.006
(−0.51)
βˆ4 −1.140
(−1.40)
−3.821
(−0.87)
1.141
(6.16)
−0.285
(−0.20)
3.627
(2.68)
−1.300
(−1.37)
3.602
(2.48)
0.318
(1.55)
0.007
(3.36)
−16.16
(−1.95)
Jap Ko Nl Nor Nz Sin Sp Swe Swi Uk
βˆ2 0.196
(3.62)
−0.163
(−2.76)
−0.051
(−1.61)
−0.025
(−0.35)
0.142
(2.60)
0.079
(1.52)
0.286
(1.99)
−0.032
(−0.45)
0.072
(1.05)
0.197
(1.39)
βˆ3 0.039
(1.44)
3E-4
(2.34)
0.014
(2.13)
−0.007
(−0.26)
0.000
(0.36)
0.000
(0.29)
0.004
(0.04)
0.016
(1.08)
0.124
(3.06)
0.015
(1.47)
βˆ4 0.005
(1.29)
0.001
(2.41)
22.846
(1.60)
−0.170
(−0.32)
−0.904
(−1.39)
1.764
(1.59)
0.059
(1.19)
1.352
(3.78)
1.374
(0.70)
1.663
(0.74)
Parameter estimates for the response of interest rates to domestic fundamentals obtained
from single country regressions according to model (4.1). t-statistics based on Newey-West
standard errors are given in parentheses.
Moreover, countries with minor FX flexibility such as Belgium, Denmark, France,
Italy and Sweden might have adjusted interest rates to stabilize their exchange rates.
Accordingly, deviations from steady states of output and inflation do not have a
significant impact on interest rate changes in these countries.
Concerning panel estimation of interest rate transmission, overly general classifi-
cations as used in this section might not be fully appropriate due to within group
parameter heterogeneity. Moreover, such classifications are of limited applicability
for policy advice since each economy might have its individual preference with regard
to an acceptable degree of FX rate variation. The requirement for a thorough differ-
entiation among states of FX flexibility motivates an assessment based on continuous
functional coefficient panel models.
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4.3 Functional coefficient panel models
In theory, the macroeconomic trilemma formalizes that the exposure of small economies’
interest rates to world market rates should exhibit a continuous relation to its factual
FX flexibility and the state of capital mobility. In the spirit of the functional model
in Herwartz and Xu (2009) consider a semiparametric extension of (4.2)
yˇit = xˇ
′
itα(ω) + uit, α(ω) = (α1(ω), α2(ω)), (4.6)
where yˇit, xˇit are obtained from the partial regression in (4.2). The specification in
(4.6) is a local model for interest rate transmission dynamics in the sense that its
parameters α(ω) depend on a representative continuum of states ω that, for instance,
summarize i) country specific exchange rate variability (discussed in section 4.3.1),
or ii) both country specific exchange rate variability and capital mobility (section
4.3.2). Semiparametric functional coefficient estimators are subject to the curse of
(factor) dimensionality. With respect to subsequent choices of factor variables, note
that the factor dimension will not exceed 2 given the available sample size of quarterly
observations. Technical details on estimation and inference in functional coefficient
models are given in appendix A and appendix B, respectively.
4.3.1 Dynamic state definitions: FX flexibility
For the moment assume that, during the last two decades, capital has been sufficiently
and uniformly mobile such that the ability of small developed economies to influence
domestic interest rates has been predominantly determined by the flexibility of FX
rates. Let ψfxit denote the logarithmic realized exchange rate volatility in economy i
over the last quarter6, i.e.
ψfxit = ln(RV
fx,ij
t−1 ), RV
fx,ij
t =
∑
m∈t
(∆ ln sij,m)
2,
where sij,m is the price of benchmark currency j in terms of domestic currency i in
month m. In the following, all state variables (or factors, henceforth) are given in
6Taking logs improves the distributional features of realized volatilities which tend to be strongly
skewed to the left. Since, especially for the EMU members, FX volatilities may become zero, we
add a small constant of 0.01 to all volatilities before taking logs.
58
Chapter 4 Monetary Independence I: Interest Rate Autonomy
standardized form to facilitate (cross sectional) overall comparability. Let
ω
(1)
it = (ψ
fx
it − ψ¯fxi )/σi(ψfxi ),
with ψ¯fxi =
1
T
T∑
t=1
ψfxit , σi(ψ
fx
i ) =
√√√√ 1
T − 1
T∑
t=1
(ψfxit − ψ¯fxi )2
be a measure of FX variability that characterizes the time path of (standardized)
realized FX volatility for a given country. To contrast the state of FX flexibility for
an economy in time t against other markets, define a standardized state variable
ω
(2)
it = (ψ
fx
it − ψ¯fxt )/σt(ψfxt ),
with ψ¯fxt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ψfxit , σt(ψ
fx
t ) =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(ψfxit − ψ¯fxt )2.
Finally, let ω = (ω(1), ω(2))′ summarize the observable states of country specific ex-
change rate flexibility. For illustrational puposes, figure 4.1 sketches time paths of
observed states ω
(1)
it and ω
(2)
it for Austria, Switzerland and Japan which may be seen
to represent economies with unconditionally low, intermediate and high FX flexibility.
Obviously, with respect to country specific variability over time and measured against
other economies, we diagnose state dependence in both directions. For example, the
Swiss Franc is characterized by an increase in FX rate volatility ω
(1)
it after 1999. More-
over, this increase led to a reclassification (due to ω
(2)
it ) in the sense that the Swiss
Franc moved from a low FX volatility regime to more flexible states compared with
other currencies. Notably, a high realization ω
(1)
it does not necessarily imply flexible
FX rates. It rather measures if an economy is characterized by a relatively high FX
variation compared with its own historical experience. Accordingly, a high ω
(1)
it in
combination with a low ω
(2)
it might reflect that a pegging economy has difficulties to
maintain the peg.
Histograms of factor variables ω
(1)
it , ω
(2)
it are shown in the upper panel of figure 4.2.
The apparent peaks featuring FX based factors reflect quotes belonging to EMU mem-
bers after the introduction of the Euro. Since intra EMU FX rates have been fixed
since then, FX volatilities of all EMU countries were zero, implying a high concen-
tration of observations in the corresponding area of the empirical support. Note that
though the latter FX volatilities are zero, there are some observations falling below
EMU implied state measures, which is due to the cross sectional standardization. In
appendix C, additional empirical results are provided for a subsample of panel data
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excluding quotes associated with intra EMU dynamics (i.e. interest rate transmission
from Germany to Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Finland and
Irland after 1998Q4) to show that these observations not decisive for our conclusions.
Figure 4.1: Selection of observed state variables and corresponding interest rates
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Factor variables and interest rates including the corresponding reference rates (dashed)
for a selection of economies (Austria, Switzerland and Japan). According to ω
(2)
it , these
economies might be (on average) considered representative for not flexible, interme-
diate and flexible currency regimes.
60
Chapter 4 Monetary Independence I: Interest Rate Autonomy
Figure 4.2: State variables: Empirical distribution
ω
(1)
i,t ω
(2)
i,t
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
0
50
100
150
200
250
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
0
50
100
150
200
250
ω
(2b)
i,t ω
(3)
i,t
−2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
50
100
150
200
250
−2 −1 0 1 2 3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Histograms of factor variables measuring states of FX flexibility (i.e. ω
(1)
i,t , ω
(2)
i,t , ω
(2b)
i,t )
and capital mobility (ω
(3)
i,t ). Formal definitions are given in section 4.3.1, section 4.3.2
and appendix B.
4.3.2 Dynamic state definitions: The macroeconomic trilemma
The macroeconomic trilemma suggests that monetary autonomy is lost if capital is
fully mobile and exchange rates are stable. Hence, in addition to measures of FX rate
stability, (country specific) measures of capital mobility should be taken into account
explicitly as determinants of monetary dependence. We rely on ω
(2)
it (i.e. cross section-
ally evaluated FX volatility) for measuring FX variation. Capital mobility and capital
market globalization has often been approximated by the extent of international real
interest rate equalization (e.g. Mishkin 1984, Obstfeld and Taylor 2002). Let ψcapit
denote the logarithmic7 absolute real interest rate differential between economy i and
benchmark country j prevailing in time t − 1. Formally, ψcapit = ln(|rit−1 − rjt−1|).
7Similar to section 4.3.1, we add a small constant and take logs to reduce the skewness of the factor
distribution.
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We define real interest rates rit as before in section 2.2. Moreover, real interest rate
differentials enter in lagged form to avoid endogeneity problems. Summarizing coun-
try specific time paths of capital mobility over the last 20 years, a state measure for
capital mobility is defined as
ω
(3)
it = (ψ
cap
it − ψ¯capi )/σi(ψcapi ),
with ψ¯capi =
1
T
T∑
t=1
ψcapit , σi(ψ
cap
i ) =
√√√√ 1
T − 1
T∑
t=1
(ψcapit − ψ¯capi )2.
To underline that our results are robust to alternative measures of capital mobility,
we additionally provide functional estimates based upon the (time varying) Chinn-
Ito financial openness index (Chinn and Ito 2008) in the appendix. Finally, let ω =
(ω(2), ω(3))′ summarize states of exchange rate stability and country specific capital
market integration. Dynamic and unconditional characteristics of the estimated states
of capital market integration are displayed in figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
4.3.3 Results
Monetary independence as a function of FX rate flexibility
Figure 4.3 displays parameter estimates for the two-factor functional coefficient model
obtained over a representative continuum of states measuring exchange rate flexibility
defined in section 4.3.1. At first, one observes that, quantified by αˆ1(ω) and αˆ2(ω),
international transmission decreases over states of relatively high FX variation. Ac-
cordingly, results for global tests for factor invariance of transmission dynamics given
in table 4.4 suggest this functional relationship to be globally significant.
Locally, figure 4.3 shows that economies which are characterized by a low realized
FX volatility in comparison with other economies suffer from the highest contempora-
neous transmission αˆ1(ω) of reference nominal interest rates. Given that a currency is
in a state of relatively low country specific FX variability (i.e. ω(1) ≈ −1), and, more-
over, this variation is rather small with respect to the other currencies in the sample
(e.g. ω(2) ≈ −1), monthly contemporaneous interest rate transmission αˆ1(ω) = 0.9 is
close to unity, implying almost full transmission of world interest rates.
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Figure 4.3: Functional coefficient estimates αˆ1(ω),αˆ2(ω): FX flexibility
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The upper (lower) panel presents a three dimensional plot of functional coefficient αˆ1(ω) (αˆ2(ω)), where ω = (w
(1), w(2)) and
corresponding selected partial (i.e. two dimensional) functional relations with confidence intervals given in dashed lines. For
instance, the first row in the upper right panel shows selected relationships αˆ1(w
(1),−1), αˆ1(w(1), 0) and αˆ1(w(1), 1), while the second
row presents αˆ1(−1, w(2)), αˆ1(0, w(2)) and αˆ1(1, w(2)).
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Table 4.4: Factor dependence: Global inference
(ω(1), ω(2)) (ω(2), ω(3)) (ω(2b), ω(3)) (ω(2), ω(3b)) (ω(2), ω(3))b
uˆ′uˆ/TN 0.216 0.211 0.214 0.217 0.263
(ω(p∗), ω(q)) .022 .006 .090 .004 .069
(ω(p), ω(q∗)) .002 .000 .001 .000 .038
(ω(p∗), ω(q∗)) .000 .000 .000 .000 .006
Test for global factor dependence based on the fit uˆ′uˆ/TN of model (4.6). p-values
obtained by resampling according to appendix A are given in the lower three rows.
Resampling is denoted with asterisks. For instance, (ω(p)∗, ω(q)) implies that only the
first factor is resampled, while (ω(p)∗, ω(q)∗) indicates a 2-tupel wise resampling from
(ω(p), ω(q)). Accordingly, these tests account for partial and joint factor invariance of
interest rate transmission, respectively.
In turn, economies with relatively high realized FX volatility (ω(2) ≈ 1) are less
severely subject to contemporaneous interest rate transmission varying between αˆ1(ω) =
0.4 and αˆ1(ω) = 0.5. Since corresponding local confidence intervals do not include zero
transmission α1(ω) = 0, we reject interest rate autonomy for small economies with
rather flexible FX rates. Generally, state dependence of αˆ1(ω) is locally significant,
since estimates often go beyond bootstrap based 95% confidence intervals which are
derived under the assumption of state invariance (see appendix A). For example, given
that country specific FX variation is close to its historic average (ω(1) ≈ 0), we observe
transmission parameter estimates below confidence intervals if corresponding FX vari-
ation exceeds the global mean (ω(2) ≥ 0). In turn, functional transmission estimates
are above confidence bounds if observed FX variation falls short of ω(2) ≤ −0.5.
Measuring the adjustment speed towards a steady state nominal interest rate dif-
ferential, we observe two state specific characteristics for αˆ2(ω). Firstly, nominal in-
terest rates adjust (significantly) faster when exchange rate volatility is relatively low
in comparison with the cross sectional average level of FX rate volatility (ω(2) ≈ −1).
Moreover, if the domestic currency features higher variability than most other cur-
rencies (e.g. ω(2) ≈ 1), parameter estimates are close to or even above zero which
means that domestic rates do not adjust to the steady state. In line with adjustment
parameter estimates from conventional parametric panel models in section 4.2.4, state
invariance implied local confidence intervals include αˆ1(ω) = 0. In contrast, highlight-
ing the merits of local estimation, state dependent estimates are often not included
in the interval. For all levels of country specific variation, the speed of adjustment
significantly increases in the cross sectional measure of FX stability ω(2). For low
values of ω(2), αˆ2(ω) approaches −0.2, implying a half life of deviations from steady
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state interest differentials of approximately three quarters. Secondly, we observe that
the adjustment speed also significantly increases in ω(1), with fastest estimated ad-
justment diagnosed conditional on states of high country specific volatilities ω(1) and
relatively low states ω(2). This observation could reflect scenarios in which the sta-
bility of (pegged) currencies is threatened by speculative market forces. Monetary
authorities might then rise interest rates so markedly that speculators refrain from
going short in the domestic currency (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). Such (short lived)
peaks might tend to dominate the estimated adjustment of interest rates locally for
states characterized by {ω(1) > 1, ω(2) < −1}.
Monetary independence implied by the macroeconomic trilemma
Figure 4.4 shows parameter estimates for the two-factor functional coefficient model
obtained over different (i.e. representative) states summarizing FX variability (ω(2))
and capital market integration (ω(3)) as defined in section 4.3.2. Refining the overall
evidence from parametric panel based evidence in section 4.2.4, functional estimates
αˆ1(ω) and αˆ2(ω) suggest a marked trade-off among FX stability, capital mobility
and monetary independence. Hence, the implications of the macroeconomic trilemma
seem to hold for developed economies over the last two decades.
Confirming this overall impression formally, we reject global factor invariance of
transmission dynamics at conventional significance levels according to test results in
table 4.4. Moreover, observed transmission depends on both capital mobility and
FX flexibility since partial factor invariance is rejected throughout. Thus, the extent
of FX flexibility and capital market integration matters for interest rate transmis-
sion in general. Locally, figure 4.4 shows estimated contemporaneous interest rate
transmission αˆ1(ω) to increase with exchange rate stability and capital market inte-
gration (note that high values of ω(3) indicate states of relative market disintegration).
States of rather low FX rate volatility and high capital mobility are characterized by
contemporaneous transmission estimates αˆ1(ω) close to unity that steadily decay to
αˆ1(ω) = 0.6 if capital mobility decreases (ceteris paribus).
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Figure 4.4: Functional coefficient estimates αˆ1(ω), αˆ2(ω): The Trilemma
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The upper (lower) panel presents a three dimensional plot of the functional coefficient estimate αˆ1(ω) (αˆ2(ω)), where ω = (w
(2), w(3))
and corresponding selected partial (i.e. two dimensional) functional relations with confidence intervals given in dashed lines. For
instance, the first row in the upper right panel shows selected relationships αˆ1(w
(2),−1), αˆ1(w(2), 0) and αˆ1(w(2), 1), while the second
row presents αˆ1(−1, w(3)), αˆ1(0, w(3)) and αˆ1(1, w(3)).
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In turn, if FX flexibility (i.e. ω(2)) increases, estimated transmission quickly drops
to values close to αˆ1(ω) = 0.4. Overall, it appears that a higher share of coefficient
variation is caused by FX flexibility in comparison with capital mobility induced vari-
ation. This seems intuitive since free flow of capital had been already established
for the period under investigation. Local confidence intervals underline that states
of high FX flexibility (low capital mobility) are characterized by local state invari-
ance of capital mobility (FX flexibility). Hence, under relatively immobile capital
(flexible FX rates), interest rate transmission is not subject to FX stability (capital
mobility) any longer. However, confidence bands never include αˆ1(ω) = 0 and thus,
full independence might not prevail for small economies even under high FX flexibil-
ity and/or low capital mobility. Accordingly, the predictions of the macroeconomic
trilemma most likely hold in a ’relative’ form. Similar to the evidence in figure 3,
it seems that interest rate transmission rises if ω(2) falls below a certain threshold
value ω(2) ≈ 0. Therefore, an economy with high FX flexibility might stabilize its
currency to a certain extent without suffering from an increasing exposure to changes
in foreign interest rates. Functional estimates αˆ2(ω) reveal that the adjustment of
domestic interest rates to their steady state differential tends to be the faster the less
flexible are corresponding FX rates. Again, parameter variation seems to be predom-
inantly governed by states of FX flexibility ω(2), while (in line with evidence based
on parametric models) we also diagnose higher adjustment speed in states of lower
capital market integration. Since market integration is measured by means of the real
interest rate differential, relatively high capital market disintegration coupled with
relatively low FX variability implies raised currency risk premia for a given economy.
To some extent, this state (and corresponding local adjustment parameter estimates)
should coincide with the case where (target) FX rates are threatened by specula-
tive market forces discussed in section 4.3.3. In contrast to the local behavior of
αˆ1(ω), we find that the foreign influence on domestic rates in terms of αˆ2(ω) increases
whenever FX rate volatility decreases. Thus, even stabilizing the domestic currency
moderately might be accompanied by a stronger adjustment to the steady state inter-
est rate differential. Also reflecting empirical results from section 4.3.3, we conclude
that free floating economies might moderately attenuate FX rate movements without
substantially increasing their exposure to foreign interest rates. However, economies
with average FX rate flexibility substantially forfeit remaining degrees of freedom of
domestic monetary policy by further decreasing flexibility.
67
Chapter 4 Monetary Independence I: Interest Rate Autonomy
4.4 Conclusions
The macroeconomic trilemma suggests a binding trade-off among three fundamen-
tal aims of monetary authorities: To benefit from full capital mobility, to minimize
variation in FX rates and to be able to conduct an independent monetary policy tar-
geting at domestic goals. Since presumed gains in monetary autonomy are the main
motivation to accept some variation in FX rates, a comprehensive assessment of this
trade-off is a core prerequisite for monetary policymakers’ decisions on the appropri-
ate extent of FX rate flexibility. In this study we put particular effort on providing an
extensive empirical assessment of the macroeconomic trilemma and its implications
for monetary independence of developed economies by means of a flexible and uniform
econometric panel framework.
Evidence from conventional parametric panel models indicates that, in line with
Shambaugh (2004) and in contrast to Frankel et al. (2004), interest rates of more
flexible currency regimes are less subject to exposure to foreign interest rates. More-
over, we argue that former evidence might have suffered from biased transmission
estimates due to the lack of control variables ruling out the effects of synchronized
business cycle behavior. Flexible semiparametric panel model estimates and corre-
sponding tests strongly support the general validity of the macroeconomic trilemma,
where transmission seems to be a positive (nonlinear) function of FX rate stability and
capital mobility. Countries with fixed FX rates and closely integrated capital mar-
kets share one-to-one interest rate movements with their reference economies, while
states that are either characterized by higher FX variation or lower capital mobility
(or both) feature markedly less transmission. However, as interest rate transmission
does not appear to linearly increase in FX rate flexibility and capital mobility, there is
some scope for attenuating FX rate fluctuations at little cost, since (at least for more
flexible regimes) marginal decreases in FX rate flexibility do not necessarily imply a
marked strengthening of transmission. Accordingly, gains in monetary independence
are substantial if a country abdicates pegging its FX rate, but the marginal benefit of
tolerating higher FX flexibility quickly vanishes. Lastly, this study focuses on mone-
tary dependence of developed economies. Besides data availability problems, develop-
ing economies are not considered since they deserve a different (separate) treatment
with respect to their excessively volatile interest rate characteristics, risk premia and
choice of domestic fundamentals. Studying determinants of monetary autonomy for
developing countries in a modified (semiparametric) model is considered as an issue
for future research.
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Appendix A
Estimation and Inference
Estimation of the functional coefficient vector α(ω) is implemented as a multivariate
version of the Nadaraya Watson estimator (Nadaraya, 1964; Watson, 1964). The es-
timator is defined as αˆ(ω) = X−1(ω)Y(ω) and may be seen as a pooled weighted least
squares estimator where observations ωit close to ω enter with higher weights than ob-
servations ωit deviating more from ω. The latter weighting procedure is implemented
via multiplicative kernel functions. Formally,
X (w(p), w(q)) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
xˇitxˇ
′
itKh(ω
(p)
it − ω(p))Kh(ω(q)it − ω(q)),
Y(w(p), w(q)) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
xˇityitKh(ω
(p)
it − ω(p))Kh(ω(q)it − ω(q)),
where {(p, q)} ∈ {(1, 2); (2, 3)}. Moreover, Kh(•) = 1hK( •h) and K denotes a quartic
kernel function, i.e. K(u) = 15
16
(1 − u2)2I(|u| ≤ 1). For bandwidth selection, we use
Scott’s rule of thumb (Scott 1992), multiplied by a factor of 1.8. Smaller bandwidths
turn out to eventually result in numerical problems that occur in regions of very sparse
data involving singularity of local regression design matrices.
Local inference on α(ω) is based on bootstrap-based confidence intervals for param-
eters associated with international interest rate transmission α1(ω), α2(ω). To infer if
functional coefficient estimates are locally state dependent, the following factor based
resampling scheme has been proposed by Herwartz and Xu (2009):
1. Local parameter estimates for model (4.6) can be considered as a function of
the data and the chosen bandwidth parameter, i.e.
αˆi(ω) = f(yit, xˇ
′
it, ωit = (ω
(p)
it , ω
(q)
it ), h, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T ). (4.7)
2. Factor dependence and invariance of coefficients in model (4.7) are distinguished
by a comparison among local coefficient estimates and corresponding bootstrap
coefficient estimates
αˆ∗(ω) = f(yit, xˇ
′
it, ω
∗
it = (ω
(p)∗
it , ω
(q)∗
it ), h, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T ). (4.8)
Bivariate tuples ω∗it = (ω
(p)∗
it , ω
(q)∗
it ) are drawn with replacement from the set of
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bivariate variables {{ω(p)it , ω(q)it }Ni=1}Tt=1. Note that sample information on yit, xˇ′it
is not affected by the bootstrap. Therefore, the proposed scheme will gener-
ate a factor variable that, per construction, is independent of the functional
coefficients. If the null hypothesis of state invariance is true, estimates αˆ(ω)
and αˆ∗(ω) should only marginally deviate from each other if evaluated over the
support of the factor variable.
3. A large number of draws, R = 1000 say, of bootstrap estimates αˆ∗(ω) is con-
sidered as sufficient to approximate the underlying distribution under the null
hypothesis of state invariance. For inferential purposes, estimates αˆ(ω) are
shown with confidence intervals that present the 25th and 975th order statistic
of αˆ∗(ω). In this sense, the actual estimate is regarded to differ locally from the
unconditional relation with 5% significance if the local confidence interval does
not include the local estimate αˆ(ω).
Local inference by means of confidence intervals is informative to characterize func-
tional relationships conditional on specific economic states ω. The same factor based
resampling scheme applies to test for ’overall’ factor dependence of interest rate trans-
mission α1(ω) and long term adjustment α2(ω). For this purpose we consider the
residual sum of squares (RSS) of the functional regression
yˇit = xˇ
′
itα(ω) + uit.
The null hypothesis of overall factor invariance, H0 : α(ω) = α is rejected with 5%
significance if the sample based RSS statistic exceeds the 95% quantile of the re-
spective distribution of bootstrap based counterparts. Notably, the introduced factor
resampling scheme applies for testing the hypothesis of global joint factor invariance.
To test for partial factor invariance, we draw with replacement from one factor only,
while letting the other factor (and thus its potential link to the data) unchanged.
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Appendix B
Robustness of empirical results
B.1 Using the Chinn-Ito index of financial openness
To highlight the robustness of our results, we further estimate functional interest rate
transmission conditional on exchange rate stability ω(2) and the time varying Chinn
and Ito index of financial openness, denoted as ω(3b) (Chinn and Ito 2008). The index
does not enter in standardized form since it is comparable over distinct countries
and its empirical range is very similar to the range of the other factors. Interest
rate transmission estimates conditional on (ω(2), ω(3b)) are given in the upper panel of
figure 4.5. At first sight, the estimated functional patterns in figure 4.5 appear very
similar to those presented in figure 4.4. Contemporaneous transmission is literally
zero in states of low capital mobility. Moreover, states of high FX variability are
also characterized by very weak transmission. Given that capital mobility and/or
FX stability increase, contemporaneous transmission increases. Global test results
in table 4.4 reveal that the functional pattern is highly significant. Thus, our main
findings appear robust with respect to alternative measures of capital mobility.
Figure 4.5: Robustness check I
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B.2 Using an exchange rate band based factor variable
One natural way to generalize the exchange rate band approach (Shambaugh 2004)
in a dynamic way is to consider the realized size of (hypothetical) FX bands. Define
ψfxbit = ln(max(| ln(sij,m)− ln(sij,z)|)), ∀m ∈ z; z = {t− 1, . . . , t− 4},
where sij,z denotes the median FX rate (i.e. the presumed target value) that pre-
vailed over the last twelve months. Moreover, max(| ln(sij,m) − ln(sij,z)|) is the cor-
responding maximum percentaged absolute deviation from sij,z which is considered
in logs to reduce the skewness of the factor distribution. Furthermore, ω
(2b)
it =
(ψfxbit − ψ¯fxbt )/σt(ψfxbt ), where ψ¯fxbt is the empirical (time dependent) cross sectional
mean of all country specific factors ψ¯fxbt =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ψ
fxb
it , and correspondingly, σt(ψ
fxb
t ) =√
1
N−1
∑N
i=1(ψ
fxb
it − ψ¯fxbt )2 is their cross sectional dispersion.
Functional parameter estimates in the upper panel of figure 4.6 suggest that the
overall result remains robust when substituting realized FX volatility with the realized
width of a presumed FX band.
Figure 4.6: Robustness check II
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B.3 Using interest rate differentials detrended in terms of OLS
We replace the ’pseudo error correction term’, (ξit−1 − ξjt−1 − φhpijt−1), in (4.6) by an
interest rate differential detrended by means of OLS, namely (ξit−1−ξjt−1− δˆ1− δˆ2t−
δˆ3t
2). The augmentation with deterministic trend parameters (δˆ2 and δˆ2) allows for
diminishing of time trends in presence of increasing market integration. Eyeballing
figure 4.7 suggests that the functional adjustment pattern appears in line with the
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benchmark case where HP filtered interest differentials are considered.
Figure 4.7: Robustness check III
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Functional coefficient estimates evaluated conditional on ω = (w(2), w(3)), where
(ξit−1 − ξjt−1 − φhpijt−1) is replaced by the interest rate differential (ξit−1 − ξjt−1 −
δˆ1 − δˆ2t− δˆ3t2) in model (4.6).
B.4 Excluding intra EMU quotes
One might conjecture that observed functional characteristics in figure 4.4 just re-
flect two states implied by EMU and non-EMU observations. Hence, we additionally
provide estimates for a subsample of panel data excluding intra EMU quotes (i.e.
interest rate transmission from Germany to Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Nether-
lands, Spain, Finland and Irland after 1998Q4) to show that these observations are not
decisive for our conclusions. Associated estimates conditional on (ω(2), ω(3))b exclud-
ing intra EMU quotes are given in figure 4.8. As a result, conclusions are qualitatively
robust for the substantially smaller data set. Most importantly, local estimates that
might be presumed to predominantly reflect observed transmission patterns within
the EMU (i.e. αˆ1 ≈ 1 and αˆ2 ≤ −0.2 located in states of high capital mobility
and low FX flexibility) hardly change. Accordingly, factor invariance is throughout
rejected by means of respective diagnostics documented in table 4.4.
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Figure 4.8: Robustness check IV
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Chapter 5
Monetary Independence II: The
international linkage of the inflation
climate
5.1 Introduction
A core concern of monetary policy is long term price stability. Nowadays, the frame-
work of inflation targeting has become a widely followed strategy to implement a
moderate and predictable evolution of prices. While the European Central Bank
(ECB) considers inflation targeting as one of its two main monetary policy axioms,
for instance, the Bank of Canada (BoC) or the Bank of England (BoE) explicitly
follow this strategy. The so-called inflation forecast targeting provides a useful guide-
line for inflation targeting (Svensson 1997, Leitemo 2006). Inflation targeting and the
corresponding adjustment of monetary instruments should be forward looking since
expected inflation rates constitute a central determinant for a firms’ setting of future
prices. Since the essential element in such a framework is to anchor long run infla-
tion expectations, the extent to which central banks are able to implement stable,
uniform and definite beliefs is crucial. Bernanke (2003) notes that well-anchored in-
flation expectations facilitate the achievement of price stability in the long term and
the stabilization of output and employment in the short run.
A central bank’s ability to bring long term inflation in line with the announced
target is an important aspect of the debate on currency regimes and monetary in-
dependence. The latter belongs to the lead arguments in favor of floating FX rates.
Facing integrated markets, central banks of small open economies are subject to con-
straints that are summarized in the macroeconomic trilemma (Obstfeld, Shambaugh
and Taylor 2005). The choice among a free flow of capital, a stable FX rate and inde-
75
Chapter 5 Monetary Independence II: The international linkage of the inflation climate
pendent control over inflation targets is restricted, as only two of the three objectives
can be achieved jointly. Central banks are considered to be able to set their long
run domestic inflation rate independently at the ’cost’ of floating FX rates. Empiri-
cal evidence, however, shows that flexible FX rates do not offer complete insulation.
Building on an early study by Darby and Lothian (1989), Eun and Jeong (1999) and
Yang, Guo and Wang (2006) examine international transmission of G7 inflation rates
and detect strong linkages among these economies. Other studies address the issue of
monetary independence by analyzing international linkage of nominal interest rates.
Under market integration and floating FX rates, cross sectional independence of nomi-
nal interest rates hints at the ability to determine inflation expectations domestically.
Frankel, Schmukler and Serven (2004) investigate the international transmission of
nominal interest rates for different currency regimes and document that both floating
and fixed FX rate regimes show transmission dynamics, with slower adjustments fea-
turing the former. According to Frankel et al. (2004) the US, Japan and Germany
are the only economies capable to set their own interest rates.
While the empirical literature documents nominal linkages, it is rarely discussed
why nominal linkages prevail under floating FX regimes. Calvo and Reinhart (2002)
point out that ’a pure float is an artifact of economics textbooks’ and justify nom-
inal linkages under flexible FX regimes with a ’fear of floating’. The latter notion
refers to occasional FX market interventions likely motivated by strong pass through
from FX rates to prices or liabilities in other currencies (Calvo and Reinhart 2002,
Hausmann, Panizza and Stein 2001). Confirming this view, recent evidence by Lubik
and Schorfheide (2007) underpins the relevance of (trade weighted) nominal exchange
rates in policy rules presumed for the BoC or BoE. With respect to existing trade
relations, long term inflation of small economies such as the UK (Canada) should
especially be subject to the monetary policy in the EMU/US (US). A closer investi-
gation of the determinants of nominal linkages is of immediate interest for monetary
authorities and open macro economists.
In this chapter we empirically assess first and second order linkages of inflation
compensation as a measure of nominal dependence in a free floating subsystem of the
G7 comprising Canada (CA), France (FR), the UK and the US. In particular, our
interest is to clarify if these linkages could be traced back to the influence of monetary
policies of major central banks (such as the ECB or the US Federal Reserve System
(Fed)) on the smaller economies. Moreover, the role of imperfect FX rate flexibility
as a potential reason for nominal linkages is highlighted.
We contribute to the existing literature in several directions concerning the data,
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the measure of dependence and the applied econometric methodology. While re-
cent assessments of monetary independence (Eun and Jeong 1999, Yang et al. 2006,
Frankel et al. 2004, Obstfeld et al. 2005) rely on inflation or nominal interest rate
linkages, we investigate the degree to which ex-ante inflation rates are determined
on international markets. We use inflation compensation as implied by the (liquidity
adjusted) difference between yields of ’Treasury Inflation Protected Securities’ (TIPS,
hereafter) and corresponding conventional bonds. So–called breakeven inflation rates
are regarded to measure future inflation prospects. For an accurate measurement of
nominal dependencies, the use of breakeven inflation rates offers important advan-
tages. Compared with short term interest rates comovements of long term inflation
compensation should less reflect synchronized real business cycle dynamics triggering
common dynamics of national policy interest rates. Moreover, linkages of nominal
interest rates might reflect cross market features of both real rates or inflation com-
pensation. Compared with inflation rates breakeven rates instantaneously summarize
the available information about the nominal effects of current and future monetary
policy. Notably, quantifying nominal dependence by means of realized inflation rates
might be criticized since, besides inflation expectations, also past inflation rates and
the current output gap determine current inflation rates.
In contrast to former studies, we provide evidence based on both first and sec-
ond order characteristics. A vector autoregressive model (VAR) is employed to asses
transmission (Granger causality) among first order moments. Moreover, second order
characteristics are quantified by means of realized correlations. Finally, the comove-
ments among inflation compensations are related to observable measures of i) global
shocks, ii) monetary policies of dominating economies (i.e. EMU and the US) and
iii) country specific FX rate flexibility.
To preview the results, VAR estimates reveal multidirectional patterns of Granger
causality among (mostly nonstationary) international breakeven inflation rates. Em-
pirical correlations among breakeven rates differ from zero, with stronger realized
correlations diagnosed for closely linked markets. In particular long run inflation
prospects in CA vary with expectations concerning long run US inflation and, thus,
fail to fully reflect the domestic inflation target. Similarly, also inflation expectations
in the Euro area1 and the UK are subject to common shocks, but empirical corre-
lations vary on a lower scale. Thus, in comparison with the BoC, the BoE is likely
better able to target domestic long run inflation. Taking a dynamic perspective, em-
1The French breakeven rate is assumed to represent inflation expectations in the Euro area. The
ECB also refers to the French breakeven inflation rate in its Monthly Bulletins.
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pirical findings suggest that Canadian and US rate correlations are relatively high if
i) the US conducts an expansionary monetary policy, ii) US inflation uncertainty is
high or iii) if the CA/US FX rate volatility is low. Similarly, UK and EMU linkage is
strengthened if (long term) inflation expectations in the Euro area become relatively
uncertain. Nominal linkage between the UK and the US rises with US inflation un-
certainty and strong fluctuations in UK FX reserves that likely indicate FX market
interventions of the BoE.
In summary, we find evidence that inflation prospects in small economies with free
floating currencies are influenced by monetary policy related measures of its respective
large trading partner. Moreover, nominal linkages in two dimensional systems CA
and US, as well as UK and US increase if agents perceive FX rates as rather stable.
Therefore, monetary autonomy might vary according to public beliefs concerning the
relevance of exchange rate targets in policy functions of the BoC or BoE (Lubik and
Schorfheide 2007).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next Section introduces the
data and sketches the liquidity adjustment of breakeven inflation. Section 3 provides
a VAR analysis for international breakeven rates. As we cannot identify a viable long
run relationship, monthly realized correlations of breakeven rate changes are deter-
mined in Section 4. Moreover, these correlation paths are conditioned on measurable
economic variables (factors) characterizing i) global (real) shocks, ii) dominance of
foreign monetary policy and iii) FX rate flexibility. Section 5 summarizes the main
findings and concludes.
5.2 Liquidity Adjusted Breakeven Rates
5.2.1 Data
We analyze breakeven inflation rates as implied by the spread of 10 year nominal
and inflation indexed government bond yields for a subsystem of the G7 comprising
CA, FR, the UK and the US. Daily price quotes cover the time period 4/2/2001-
9/30/2008. For the construction of 10 year breakeven inflation rates, 10 year nominal
interest rates are available for all markets considered. In contrast, official quotes for 10
year real interest rates are only available for the UK and, since January 2003 published
by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for the US. UK real rates as quoted by the
BoE are directly drawn from Datastream. For the period before 2003, the US 10 year
constant maturity rate is determined by linear interpolation of real yields to maturity
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of 2011 and 2012 US TIPS yields. Accordingly, the 10 year constant maturity French
real interest rate is approximated by linear interpolation of real yields to maturity of
2010, 2015 and 2030 OATis as obtained from the website of Agence France Tre´sor.
The Canadian real rate is approximated by the long term benchmark bond yield
reported by the BoC. Further details on the data sources are provided in Table 5.1.
5.2.2 Liquidity adjustment
Recent studies (Shen and Corning 2001, Sack and Elsasser 2004, or Shen 2006) suggest
that ’raw’ breakeven inflation rates might only weakly approximate expected inflation
since premia paid for relatively lower liquidity shift the real yields of TIPS above
the ’true’ real interest rates. As a consequence, breakeven inflation rates tend to
underestimate expected inflation and inflation risk. Owing to limited data availability
we correct breakeven rates for liquidity risk on a quarterly basis. In the following, we
use indices τ , t and m to refer to the quarterly, monthly and daily frequency of time
series variables, respectively. Along the lines in Shen (2006), consider the regression
be(i)τ − pie(i)τ = φ(i)1 + φ(i)2 Liqu(i)τ + e(i)τ , (5.1)
where be
(i)
τ and pi
e(i)
τ denote the breakeven inflation and the expected inflation rate
in country i and quarter τ with respect to a ten year horizon. Due to limited data
availability, ten year expected inflation rates are approximated by the 10 year (US),
5 year (FR) and 1 year (CA, UK) survey based forecasts. Moreover, Liqu
(i)
τ is a
TIPS market specific measure of the long run trend in market turnover obtained by
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering (Hodrick and Prescott 1997) in case of CA and the
UK. Since corresponding turnover measures are not available for FR and the US, the
HP implied long run change in volume of outstanding TIPS is used to approximate
the evolvement of liquidity of these markets. If liquidity measures were available at
the monthly (daily) frequency, one could use (5.1) to adjust breakeven rates at these
frequencies. Presuming that liquidity premia adjust only smoothly over time, monthly
observations (Liqu
(i)
t ) are determined from quarterly quotes (Liqu
(i)
τ ) by means of a
frequency conversion implemented in EViews 5.1 (’quadratic match average’). Given
estimates φˆ
(i)
1 , φˆ
(i)
2 from the (quarterly) regression (5.1), the monthly breakeven rate
adjusted for liquidity is approximated as b˜e
(i)
t = be
(i)
t − φˆ(i)1 − φˆ(i)2 Liqu(i)t . Note that
breakeven rates are only adjusted by means of a constant and a smooth liquidity
measure. Therefore, the inconsistent time horizons of survey inflation data should
not severely derogate the reliability of adjusted breakeven rates as long as short and
79
C
h
a
p
ter
5
M
o
n
eta
ry
In
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
II:
T
h
e
in
tern
a
tio
n
a
l
lin
k
a
g
e
o
f
th
e
in
fl
a
tio
n
clim
a
te
Table 5.1: Data sources
Data Source (Code)
CA real l-term Datastream (CNBBRLT)
CA 10y nom http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/en/rates/yield curve.html
FR OATI 2009, 2013, 2030 http://www.aft.gouv.fr/article 1004.html?id article=1004&id rubrique=256
FR 10y nom Datastream ( FRBRYLD)
UK 10y real Datastream (UKGR10Y)
UK 10y nom Datastream (UKBN10Y)
US TIPS 2011, 2012 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/82?cid=82&pageID=2
US 10y real http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DFII10?cid=82
US 10y nom http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DGS10?cid=115
CA WES 1y exp. infl. Datastream (CNIFINFRR)
ECB SPF 5y exp. infl.; Disp. http://www.ecb.int/stats/prices/indic/forecast/html/index.en.html
UK WES 1y exp. infl. Datastream (UKIFINFRR)
US LSPF 10y exp. infl.; Disp. http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/livingston-survey/
CA RRB av. market trading Bank of Canada, Banking and Financial Statistics
FR OATI outstanding http://www.aft.gouv.fr/article 1004.html?id article=1004&id rubrique=256
UK gilt market turnover http://www.dmo.gov.uk/rpt parameters.aspx?rptCode=D4J.2&page=Turnover/Maturity
US TIPS outstanding Datastream(USGDMTSIA)
Crude oil WTI spot Datastream (CRUDOIL)
Dow jones industrials Datastream (DJINDUS)
Moodys AAA; BAA Datastream (FRMCAAA; FRMCBAA)
EURO repo benchmark rate Datastream(BBERB3M)
US federal funds rate Datastream(FRFEDFD)
FX reserves Datastream(CAI.1D.SA; EMI.1D.DA; UKI.1D.SA)
FX rates Datastream(BBCADSP; UKECBSP, BBEURSP; USBRITP)
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long term expected inflation rates roughly coincide on average.2 In accordance with
the Friedman-Ball hypothesis (Ball 1992) linking inflation uncertainty to inflation
levels, inflation risk premia might fail time invariance implicitly assumed in (5.1).
Thus, adjusted breakeven rates should slightly understate (overstate) expectations if
these are low (high). Therefore, we regard breakeven rates as measures of ’future
inflation prospects’ or the ’inflation climate’ rather than treating them as inflation
expectations in a strict sense.
Liquidity adjusted breakeven inflation rates are displayed in Figure 5.1 (solid lines,
upper four panels). As a benchmark, Figure 5.1 also shows the respective survey
expected inflation rates (dashed lines). By graphical inspection adjusted breakeven
rate dynamics appear consistent with survey implied inflation forecasts. In contrast
to professional forecasters’ long term inflation expectations in FR and the US, shorter
term expected inflation rates in CA and the UK are stronger reflected in corresponding
breakeven inflation rates. It appears that the market participants (as a whole) adjust
long term expectations stronger to the current situation as it is the case for the subset
of professional forecasters.3
To give an impression of market liquidity, Liqu
(i)
τ , and the differential between
’raw’ breakeven rates and the corresponding survey data, be
(i)
τ −pie(i)τ , both are jointly
sketched in the lower four panels of Figure 5.1. Since liquidity premia tend to push
breakeven rates below true market expectations of inflation, we observe that breakeven
rates have been increasing with the recent improvements in TIPS market liquidity.
It is also noteworthy that most spreads be
(i)
τ − pie(i)τ are negative hinting at liquidity
risk premia to be more important than inflation risk premia. Liquidity risk especially
seems to matter for US markets since the estimated risk correction amounts up to
0.8 percentage points in absolute value. The left hand side panel of Table 5.2.2
provides static regression results and an ADF statistic for testing cointegration among
be
(i)
τ − pie(i)τ and Liqu(i)τ . An equilibrium relationship is diagnosed for CA, FR and the
US, but not for the UK. This result might reflect that the UK indexed gilt market
has been well developed throughout the entire sample period. However, we conduct
liquidity adjustments in all cases.
2Similar to liquidity risk adjustments one might also argue in favor of an adjustment of breakeven
rates for inflation risk. Inflation risk premia, however, are not explicitly modeled since including
survey implied cross sectional standard deviations of inflation in (5.1), the coefficient estimates
suggested throughout negative or insignificant premia of inflation uncertainty. Consequently, we
regard time stable inflation risk premia to be contained in the constant term in (5.1).
3Notably, also survey based evidence on long term expected inflation is not unique since e.g. the
University of Michigan survey documents US long term expected inflation rates varying between
2.8 and 4.0 percentage points for the same sample period.
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Figure 5.1: Breakeven inflation rates, expected inflation and liquidity risk premia
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The upper four panels show monthly liquidity adjusted country specific breakeven inflation
rates b˜e
(i)
t (solid) versus the corresponding expected inflation from survey data (dashed line).
The lower four panels show the quarterly difference be
(i)
τ −pie(i)τ (solid) versus the estimated
risk premium φˆ
(i)
1 + φˆ
(i)
2 Liqu
(i)
τ (dashed).
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Table 5.2: Liquidity adjustment, integration and cointegration
φˆ1 φˆ2 × E-03 CI ADF c Lags H0 5% CV Trace
CA −0.876
(−4.07)
0.190
(3.20)
−3.47 −2.902
(.126)
0.319
(2.81)
1 CR = 0 57.00 43.42
(.384)
FR −0.578
(−8.21)
0.022
(10.07)
−3.25 −2.560
(.284)
0.265
(2.60)
2 CR = 1 29.50 20.49
(.439)
UK −0.047
(−0.38)
0.877
(3.60)
−2.60 −2.961
(.097)
0.268
(2.96)
1 CR = 2 13.43 7.15
(.546)
US −0.981
(−16.49)
0.052
(12.67)
−5.13 −5.365
(.000)
0.914
(5.30)
1 CR = 3 4.47 1.86
(.352)
The left hand side panel provides liquidity adjustment parameter estimates for the model be
(i)
τ −
pi
e(i)
τ = φ1 + φ2Liqu
(i)
τ + e
(i)
τ (t-statistics in parentheses) based on quarterly data. Moreover, ADF
statistics (p−values) for cointegration among be(i)τ − pie(i)τ and Liqu(i)τ are given (third column).
The corresponding 10% critical value of the Dickey-Fuller distribution is −3.07. The center panel
shows ADF statistics for liquidity adjusted monthly breakeven rates b˜e
(i)
t . Heteroskedasticity robust
p−values in parentheses are obtained by resampling (Cavaliere and Taylor 2008). The right hand side
panel documents trace test statistics (Johansen 1991) for the system of liquidity adjusted breakeven
inflation rates and respective heteroskedasticity robust p-values in parentheses (Cavaliere, Rahbek
and Taylor 2008). CR is the cointegration rank subject to testing. An intercept is included in the
cointegrating relation and the VAR. Selection of lag order 2 accords with the AIC.
For further processing, the vector of monthly liquidity adjusted breakeven rates is
denoted as yt =
(
b˜e
(CA)
t , b˜e
(FR)
t , b˜e
(UK)
t , b˜e
(US)
t
)′
. For convenience, we subsequently use
the term ’breakeven inflation’ instead of ’liquidity adjusted breakeven inflation’.
5.2.3 Economic significance
All breakeven rates displayed in Figure 5.1 show marked time variation and even trend-
ing patterns (FR or UK). Given credible monetary policy strategies, one would rather
expect four stationary processes with mean close to the respective long run inflation
target. For the case of the UK, a trending breakeven rate might be realistic since the
BoE changed its inflation target in 2003. The BoE, however, reduced the target from
2.5 to 2.0 percentage points while Figure 5.1 indicates increasing breakeven inflation.
The BoC’s inflation target range is 1 to 3 per cent, while it aims to keep inflation at
2 per cent. Although the target range is met throughout, one observes substantial
deviations from the 2% target according to survey and breakeven inflation implied
expectations. Similarly, also the evolution of the US breakeven inflation rate hints at
perceptions about future inflation and associated risks which are rather unstable in
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the short run. In the medium term, however, US inflation expectations appear to be
well anchored. Underpinning the high reputation of the ECB, the French breakeven
inflation rate varies with small amplitude and indicates rather stable expectations.
5.3 First Order Analysis of Breakeven Inflation
In this section we describe dynamic and unconditional features of breakeven inflation
rates. In the first place, unit root tests are applied to investigate if breakeven rates are
stationary around a certain anchor. Secondly, we address conditional mean dynamics
by means of a VAR model. Estimation results and diagnostic statistics for conditional
mean modeling are documented in Table 5.2.2 and Table 5.3. If not stated explicitly,
the discussion of empirical results refers to the 5% significance level.
5.3.1 (Co)integration tests
As a preliminary analysis we conduct ADF tests for the four breakeven rates applying
heteroskedasticity robust critical values obtained by resampling (Cavaliere and Taylor
2008). Unit root test statistics in the center panel of Table 5.2.2 indicate nonstation-
arity of CA, FR and UK breakeven inflation rates while the US rate is diagnosed
stationary. Assuming nonstationarity of breakeven rates, trace statistics for testing
cointegration and corresponding heteroskedasticity robust critical values (Cavaliere,
Rahbek and Taylor 2008) are documented in the right hand side panel of Table 5.2.2.
The trace statistic does not hint at cointegration such that the diagnosed system
rank implies the prevalence of four independent stochastic trends. Thus, there is no
evidence that expected inflation rates share a stable equilibrium relation. Given the
current floating regimes, the smaller economies (CA and the UK) should be able to
autonomously determine the (expected) inflation rate targets in the long run. Full
monetary independence, however, is not implied by stochastic trending since changes
of long term expected inflation rates and risk premia could be correlated across mar-
kets in the short and medium term.
5.3.2 VAR estimates and Granger causality tests
We address the issue of nominal transmission among international breakeven rates by
means of a VAR in first differences, augmented with some control variables to discrim-
inate between common reactions to global (real) shocks and nominal transmission. To
measure common dynamics in response to (real) global shocks, we employ lagged log
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changes of the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil price index and log returns of the
Dow Jones Industrial Average.4
VAR parameter estimates are documented in Table 5.3. Heteroskedasticity consis-
tent t−ratios indicate that lagged changes in the US inflation climate affect breakeven
rates in CA and (with 10% significance) in FR. In turn, the Northern American in-
flation climate seems to be positively affected by the first lag of EMU breakeven rate
changes. Cross country transmission of changes in future inflation prospects appears
moderate, since the corresponding degrees of partial explanation for the VAR equa-
tions range from 6.4% (UK) to 22.8% (CA).
To underpin the significance of these transmission channels, heteroskedasticity con-
sistent Granger causality test statistics (Hafner and Herwartz 2009) are also shown
in Table 5.3. These confirm rates in CA to be Granger caused by FR, UK and US
rates, while French rates are affected by the UK and (with 10% significance) by the
US inflation climate. Interestingly, also the US inflation climate is Granger caused
by changes of breakeven inflation in CA. Thus, a unique pattern of Granger causality
reflecting nominal US or EMU dominance over CA and the UK cannot be diagnosed.
In a similar vein, Yang et al. (2006) find that inflation is transmitted not only from
large economies to smaller ones, but also in the opposite direction.
Our findings suggest that sentiments about future inflation rates do not evolve
independently in an international context despite of free floating FX rates. At least
in the medium run, inflation expectations interact, although monetary policy actions
are conducted with respect to domestic goals. This could indicate that for small
open economies, domestic and foreign monetary policies influence long term inflation
expectations in the short and medium run. Under these circumstances central banks
could temporarily face difficulties to maintain fixed domestic long run ex-ante inflation
rates. Moreover, the existence of multidirectional transmission might highlight a need
of strengthened coordination of monetary policies.
5.4 Second Order Analysis of Breakeven Inflation
While first order analysis provides evidence for absence of long term linkages, full
monetary independence, however, might not prevail since breakeven inflation rate
changes might be correlated across markets. In this section, the case of short run
monetary independence is investigated focusing at second order dynamics. Firstly,
4Initially, we also considered changes in the US corporate bond spread as implied by the difference
in yields of Moody’s BAA and AAA bond indices. Since this measure did not significantly impact
on breakeven inflation dynamics, it is not included in the VAR.
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Table 5.3: VAR estimate and Granger causality
∆pie(CA) ∆pie(FR) ∆pie(UK) ∆pie(US) ∆pie(CA) ∆pie(FR) ∆pie(UK) ∆pie(US)
CA(-1) 0.086
(0.68)
−0.071
(−1.03)
−0.086
(−1.10)
0.018
(0.18)
DOW (-1) 0.116
(0.31)
0.845
(4.81)
0.973
(2.99)
0.743
(2.17)
CA(-2) −0.122
(−0.91)
−0.048
(−0.76)
−0.018
(−0.19)
−0.252
(−2.83)
c −0.009
(−0.71)
−0.002
(−0.32)
−0.002
(−0.19)
−0.014
(−1.37)
FR(-1) 0.674
(2.41)
0.130
(1.09)
0.280
(1.21)
0.516
(2.10)
R2
R2part
.363
.228
.508
.180
.329
.064
.412
.214
FR(-2) −0.200
(−0.76)
−0.192
(−1.34)
0.160
(1.04)
−0.102
(−0.45) ∆pie(CA) ∆pie(FR) ∆pie(UK) ∆pie(US)
UK(-1) 0.072
(0.34)
0.129
(1.38)
0.252
(1.53)
0.142
(0.93)
CA9 2.07
(.355)
1.25
(.535)
8.05
(.018)
UK(-2) −0.462
(−2.66)
−0.292
(−2.76)
−0.192
(−1.26)
−0.112
(−0.66)
FR9 6.36
(.042)
2.21
(.332)
4.54
(.103)
US(-1) 0.012
(0.07)
0.102
(1.20)
0.027
(0.22)
0.029
(0.22)
UK9 7.13
(.028)
9.97
(.007)
1.43
(.490)
US(-2) 0.424
(2.56)
0.172
(1.65)
−0.028
(−0.20)
−0.054
(−0.36)
US9 6.63
(.036)
5.47
(.065)
0.01
(.953)
OIL(-1) 0.239
(1.18)
0.325
(3.35)
0.158
(1.46)
0.190
(1.48)
All 9 33.37
(.000)
17.37
(.008)
4.69
(.585)
21.03
(.002)
VAR parameter estimates (left and upper right panel) as well as Granger causality tests (lower right) for a system of liquidity adjusted breakeven rates
in first differences. Dependent (explanatory) variables are ordered by column (row). Lag selection is according to the AIC. Residuals of the model are
serially uncorrelated according to a respective LM-statistic: 12.76, p−value 0.690 (Breusch 1978, Godfrey 1978). VAR t−statistics, as well as p-values for
tests on Granger non-causality in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimates (White 1980, Hafner and Herwartz 2009).
R2part is the degree of explanation for ∆pi
e(i)
t , after partialling out the effects of ∆pi
e(i)
t−1, ∆pi
e(i)
t−2, OIL(-1) and DOW (-1).
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the concept of monthly realized (co)variance estimation is briefly sketched. Then,
empirical patterns of realized correlations of international breakeven inflation rates
are discussed. Turning to the issue of state dependence, we list economic factors
which potentially carry explanatory content for the joint evolution of realized monthly
breakeven correlations. Lastly, potential state dependence of breakeven correlations
is investigated by means of a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model (Zellner
1962).
5.4.1 Realized correlations
Arguably, one of the simplest ways to assess volatilities of diffusion processes is to
aggregate over their high frequency (realized) squared increments (French, Schwert
and Stambaugh 1987, Schwert 1989, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys 2003).
In this nonparametric setting the consistent estimator of the monthly breakeven
(co)variance is the sum over squared daily increments,5 i.e.
RVij,t =
∑
m∈t
∆b˜e
(i)
m∆b˜e
(j)
m , {i, j} ∈ {CA, FR, UK, US}. (5.2)
Monthly realized correlations are accordingly
ρt(i, j) =
RVij,t√
RVii,tRVjj,t
, i 6= j. (5.3)
For the empirical analysis, we focus on the set of correlations ρt(CA,US), ρt(FR,UK),
ρt(FR,US) and ρt(UK,US) and disregard ρt(CA,UK) and ρt(CA,FR). Opposite to the latter,
the former set represents linkages of integrated economies to large trading partners
which might be dominating in nominal terms.
5.4.2 Empirical correlation patterns
Realized monthly correlations of breakeven rates are displayed in Figure 5.2. More-
over, corresponding unconditional means, standard deviations, test statistics for nor-
mality and differences in mean are given in Table 5.4.
5For the calculation of monthly realized correlations, daily changes of breakeven rates are used.
Daily breakeven rates are calculated as b˜e
(i)
m = be
(i)
m − φˆ(i)1 − φˆ(i)2 Liqu(i)m , where the daily liquidity
measure is obtained by means of the frequency conversion mentioned before. The high frequency
increments used to calculate monthly realized correlations of breakeven inflation rates are based
on daily changes, i.e. ∆b˜e
(i)
m = b˜e
(i)
m − b˜e
(i)
m−1.
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Eyeball inspection of Figure 5.2 reveals low persistence as well as a high ampli-
tude of breakeven correlations. For example, ρt(CA,US) varies between 0.83 and −0.13,
its sample average is ρ¯(CA,US) = 0.43, where ρ¯(i, j) = 1
T
∑T
t=1 ρt(i, j). The North-
ern American subsystem features the highest correlations, followed by the European
subsystem.
Figure 5.2: Monthly realized breakeven correlations
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Time paths of the monthly realized correlation matrix elements ρt(i, j) defined in equation (5.3).
Despite being characterized by a mean reverting tendency in the short run, correla-
tions seem to change in the medium run in terms of their average levels. For example,
correlations ρt(CA,US), ρt(FR,UK) and ρt(UK,US) have been decreasing since 2001. In
particular, rates in CA and the US show a decrease in correlations in the sequel of
spring 2003 which coincides with strong depreciations of the US Dollar.
Mean difference test results given in Table 5.4 confirm ρ¯(CA,US) to be significantly
higher than ρ¯(FR,UK), while ρ¯(FR,UK) exceeds ρ¯(FR,US) and ρ¯(UK,US). The inflation
targeting policy of the BoC could be impaired since the domestic long run inflation
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climate varies with expectations of long run US sentiments and, thus, does not fully
reflect domestic targets. Similarly, FR and the UK are subject to common shocks
hitting inflation prospects but, as empirical correlations are significantly lower, the
BoE is likely better able to target domestic inflation than the BoC.
Table 5.4: Selected statistics of realized correlations and tests for equality
Mean Std. Dev. JB ρt(FR,UK) ρt(FR,US) ρt(UK,US)
ρt(CA,US) .429 .225 1.74
(.419)
3.61
(.000)
6.38
(.000)
8.22
(.000)
ρt(FR,UK) .295 .266 0.30
(.862)
- 2.24
(.026)
3.94
(.000)
ρt(FR,US) .207 .234 12.10
(.002)
- - 1.84
(.067)
ρt(UK,US) .145 .242 1.93
(.381)
- - -
Descriptive statistics for monthly realized correlations of breakeven inflation changes (left hand side
panel), and conventional t−tests for equality in mean (right hand side), with p−values in parentheses.
For instance, the last element in the first row documents the t−statistic for testing the hypothesis
ρ(CA,US) = ρ(UK,US).
Ex-ante reasoning suggests that in case of free floating FX regimes, high shock
interdependence of long term inflation prospects should arise in response to global
shocks. However, as the actual evolvement of realized correlations appears distinct
over groups (ρt(CA,US) and ρt(FR,UK) vs. ρt(FR,US) and ρt(UK,US)), one might conjec-
ture that the observed correlation patterns are also reflections of ’local’ signalling
from a large, the US say, to small economies, as CA or the UK.
In the long run, under free floating FX rates expected inflation should be completely
determined by the expected growth in monetary aggregates. Observing correlation
measures up to 0.8 questions either full monetary autonomy in presence of floating
FX rates or the prevalence of a ’pure float’ in the spirit of Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
We subsequently introduce state variables to uncover potential triggers of nominal
linkage.
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5.4.3 State dependence of correlations
Factors used to address state dependence
Three types of conditioning variables are distinguished that could generate interde-
pendence of long term inflation prospects. In the first place, international linkage
could reflect the dominance of global over domestic shocks (Longin and Solnik 1995).
To identify comovements caused by common exposure to global (real) risk factors, we
employ measures such as oil price volatility, the US high yield corporate bond spread
and US stock market volatility. Formally, these variables are defined as
σoilt =
√
RV oilt−1, RV
oil
t =
∑
m∈t
(∆ lnOILm)
2, (5.4)
cbst = ξ
B,US
t−1 − ξA,USt−1 , (5.5)
σdowt =
√
RV dowt−1 , RV
dow
t =
∑
m∈t
(∆ lnDOWm)
2, (5.6)
where OILm is the daily price for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil, ξ
A,US
t(
ξB,USt
)
denotes Moodys aggregate AAA (BAA) US corporate bond yields, and
DOWm is the daily ’Dow Jones Industrials Average’ index. Secondly, nominal shock
interdependence of long run inflation prospects might reflect that large economies
dominate their trading partners. Corresponding to core policy instruments, realized
volatilities of the three month Euro Repo Benchmark Rate and the Federal Funds
Rate are seen to potentially trigger dependence of expected inflation in this respect.
Reflecting the current state of monetary policy in the EMU (US) the spread between
FR (US) ten year nominal interest rates and the policy rates mentioned before are
further conditioning variables. Moreover, we consider EMU (US) inflation uncertain-
ties approximated by the cross sectional dispersion of respective long term inflation
surveys. Formally, the second set of variables is
σsti,kt =
√
RV sti,kt−1 , RV
sti,k
t =
∑
m∈t
(∆stikm)
2, (5.7)
sprkt = lti
k
t−1 − stikt−1, (5.8)
σdisp,kt∈τ =
√
CSDkτ−1, CSD
k
τ =
1
Skτ − 1
Skτ∑
s=1
(
pie(k,s)τ − pie(k)τ
)2
, (5.9)
where stikt (lti
k
t ) denotes the monthly short term (long term) interest rate in country
k, k ∈ {US, EMU}. Similarly, stikm refers to daily measures. Moreover, pie(k,s)τ denotes
an individual survey forecast of participant s in country k and quarter τ , and Skτ is the
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number of professional forecasters in quarter τ , k ∈ {US, EMU}.6 The third group of
variables accounts for the view that small economies face nominal dependencies since
they refrain from pursuing a ’pure’ float (Calvo and Reinhart 2002). We rely on the
fluctuations in FX reserves and the realized volatility of FX rates to characterize the
state of floating. Floating state measures are defined as
σres,kt =
√
RV res,kt−1 , RV
res,k
t =
3∑
l=1
(∆RESkt−l)
2, (5.10)
σfx,ijt =
√
RV fx,ijt−1 , RV
fx,ij
t =
∑
m∈t
(∆ lnFXijm)
2, (5.11)
where RESkt denotes monthly FX reserves of country k, k ∈ {CA, UK, EMU}.
Moreover, FXijm are daily units of floating currency i per one unit of currency j,
{i, j} ∈ {CA,US; UK,FR; FR,US; UK,US}.
Now, consider the regression
ρt(i, j) = β1 + β2σ
oil
t + β3cbst + β4σ
dow
t + β5σ
sti,us
t + β6σ
sti,emu
t + β7spr
us
t +
β8spr
emu
t + β9σ
disp,us
t + β10σ
disp,emu
t + β11σ
res,i
t + β12σ
fx,ij
t + e
(ij)
t , (5.12)
with {i, j} ∈ {CA,US; UK,FR; FR,US; UK,US}. Throughout referring to informa-
tion available in month t− 1, explanatory variables in (5.12) are predetermined such
that the regression model may also serve as an ex-ante forecasting design. Given
marked patterns of cross equation correlation of e
(ij)
t , the model in (5.12) is imple-
mented as a SUR system. Noting that this system comprises a total of 48 parameters,
coefficients are subject to sequential pretesting. Excluding the intercept terms those
parameter estimates are subsequently removed from the system that obtain the small-
est t−ratio in absolute value. The test sequence terminates once all parameter esti-
mates share t−statistics that are at least unity in absolute value to keep the likelihood
of joint insignificance of removed parameters at conventional nominal levels.
Estimation results
Parameter estimates for (5.12) are given in Table 5.5. Residual diagnostics indicate
absence of first order serial correlation, homoskedasticity and, for the case of modeling
ρt(CA,US) and ρt(UK,US), unconditional normality. Accordingly, parameter estimates
6When calculating cross sectional standard deviations, we discarded an ’outlier’ in the US survey
data in 2005Q3, where one participant posted a 6% expected inflation while the remaining 36
participants declared expectations within a range of 2%− 4%.
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are likely efficient and p−values reliable.
Concerning the impact of global (real) shocks on correlation dynamics, we ob-
serve the volatility of the US stock market to raise realized correlations ρt(CA,US )
and ρt(FR,US ). Moreover, ρt(UK,US ) decreases in response to an increase in oil price
volatility. However, the overall impact of global (real) shock variables (cbst, σ
oil
t and
σdowt ) is moderate.
Turning to the explanatory content of variables summarizing monetary policy (σsti,kt ,
sprkt and σ
disp,k
t∈τ ), we observe that perceptions of future inflation are more synchronous
in CA and the US if the US monetary policy tries to stimulate the economy by means
of setting low policy rates inducing a steep yield curve. In addition, high inflation un-
certainty in large economies raises the respective correlations with its smaller trading
partners. Inflation uncertainty in the US impacts positively on correlations ρt(CA,US )
and ρt(UK,US ). Similarly, EMU inflation uncertainty fosters ρt(FR,UK ). Weakened
credibility of central banks or insufficiently anchored inflation expectations in ma-
jor economies seem to matter for the trading partners’ inflation climate. The latter
fact might underline that a certain share of observed correlation dynamics reflects
comovements of inflation risk premia, which also contribute to nominal dependence.
Impact estimates of measures of perceived floating (σres,kt and σ
fx,ij
t ) suggest that
realized correlations ρt(UK,US ) are increasing in the volatility of the UK FX reserve
positions with 10% significance. Lastly, a significantly negative relationship is found
between ρt(CA,US ) and respective FX volatilities. The impact estimate for FX rate
flexibility in the European subsystem is also negative, but insignificant. Thus, nominal
transmission effects operating between the US on the one hand and CA and the
UK on the other hand respond to perceived excess FX rate stability. Agents noting
an increased stability of FX rates or activity of the domestic central bank on FX
markets appear to adapt their behavior such that linkages among breakeven inflation
increase. To some extent, time variation of breakeven correlations can be traced back
to changing beliefs with regard to the actual float. The agents’ uncertainty, in turn,
reflects the fact that central banks hosting a floating currency might discretionary
intervene in FX markets.
Economically, CA has a strong incentive to influence the FX rate shared with the
US in light of its trade relations. The dominance of the US in the Canadian trade
portfolio can be verified by noting that the US Dollar enters with approximately 75%
the Canadian trade weighted exchange rate index. Moreover, the BoC is known to
eventually intervene in FX markets in both coordinated and non coordinated fashion.
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Table 5.5: Conditional analysis of monthly realized correlation dynamics-SUR
Var ρt(CA,US) ρt(FR,UK) ρt(FR,US) ρt(UK,US) Var ρt(CA,US) ρt(FR,UK) ρt(FR,US) ρt(UK,US)
c 0.197
(1.16)
−0.515
(−1.86)
0.182
(2.50)
−0.539
(−1.99)
sprust 0.051
(3.15)
0.032
(1.09)
cbst 0.168
(1.30)
spremut 0.068
(1.21)
−0.062
(−1.83)
0.076
(1.11)
σoilt −0.931
(−1.51)
−1.569
(−2.03)
σpi
e,us
t 0.752
(2.53)
0.925
(1.77)
1.259
(2.55)
σdowt 3.302
(3.38)
2.238
(1.45)
2.568
(2.24)
1.575
(1.15)
σpi
e,emu
t 0.659
(1.86)
1.386
(2.74)
0.688
(1.52)
σsti,ust 0.143
(1.40)
0.180
(1.27)
σres,it −3.4E-05
(−1.31)
4.4E-05
(1.80)
σsti,emut −0.138
(−1.00)
−0.338
(−1.63)
−0.224
(−1.19)
−0.277
(−1.49)
σfx,jt −32.44
(−5.78)
−12.53
(−1.14)
DW 2.133 1.815 1.760 1.850 Wh .110 .131 .703 .848
JB .733 .006 .003 .767
Parameter estimates for the SUR system regression ρt(i, j) = β1 + β2cbst + β3σ
oil
t + β4σ
dow
t + β5σ
sti,us
t + β6σ
sti,emu
t + β7spr
us
t + β8spr
emu
t + β9σ
pie,us
t +
β10σ
pie,emu
t +β11σ
res,i
t +β12σ
fx,ij
t +e
(ij)
t , with {i, j} ∈ {CA,US; UK,FR; FR,US; UK,US}. Variables with the smallest t−statistics are successively removed
until all t−statistics exceed unity in absolute value. Residual diagnostics on first order serial correlation (Durbin Watson statistic, DW), results for White’s
heteroskedasticity test (Wh, White 1980) and the Jarque-Bera test (JB) on unconditional normality are given for each equation in the lower panel
(p−values).
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Occasional interventions are discretionary, rather than systematic.7 In addition to
a rather opaque commitment to exchange rate flexibility, such apparent incentives
might be one reason for the sensitivity of CA long term nominal linkage to observed
exchange rate stability.
In contrast, it appears more difficult to assess if the UK inflation climate is more
subject to US or EMU monetary policy since nominal dependence seems to be gov-
erned by the exposure to both EMU and US inflation uncertainties and UK/US FX
rate stability. However, as average correlations ρ¯(FR,UK) and ρ¯(UK,US) are significantly
smaller than ρ¯(CA,US), future inflation prospects in the UK are less subject to US or
EMU monetary policies in comparison with the case of CA.
In summary, our results illustrate that integrated small economies with de jure
flexible FX rate regimes might occasionally lack full control over domestic long term
inflation expectations. Free floating currencies per se do not guarantee complete
control over long term inflation expectations, especially in states of perceived FX
rate stability and inflation uncertainty prevailing in major economies. Such state
characteristics of nominal linkages should be taken into account by central banks
conducting inflation targeting policy.
5.5 Conclusions
By standard macroeconomic theory floating FX rates establish that monetary au-
thorities have full control over the domestic price level or the target inflation rate.
Questioning full autonomy, we study first and second order linkages of liquidity ad-
justed breakeven inflation rates interpreted as a measure of future inflation prospects
in CA, FR (the EMU), the UK and the US. Apart from first order causality test-
ing, the dynamics of realized comovements are related to measurable economic states
accounting for the monetary policy impact of a foreign (large) economy on domestic
inflation prospects.
Liquidity adjusted breakeven inflation rates are mostly nonstationary, but not sub-
ject to a long run relation. The first order causality structure indicates that future
inflation prospects are transmitted not only from large economies (such as the US)
to smaller economies, but also in the reverse direction. Second order dynamics un-
cover that inflation prospects are characterized by markedly time varying comove-
ments. Generally, stronger contemporaneous correlations are observed for integrated
7See the homepage of the BoC (http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/backgrounders/bg-e2.html) for
further information
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economies sharing intense trade relationships. Highest correlation statistics are found
for CA and US breakeven inflation rate changes, while also correlations between the
UK and the EMU are considerably high.
Finding that relatively small integrated economies such as CA show nominal link-
age to their major trading partner, we try to discover fundamental determinants of
nominal interdependence. Comovements are related to (observable) characteristics of
the current conduct of monetary policy such as the volatilities in policy short term
interest rates, yield curve slopes and inflation uncertainty prevailing in the US and the
EMU. To motivate why the monetary policy in large economies could influence future
inflation prospects in smaller economies, we further relate these linkages to the ’fear
of floating’ (Calvo and Reinhart 2002). Changes in breakeven correlations are seen
to arise due to agents’ uncertainty about the perfection of the current float. Inflation
uncertainty in large economies is found to increase realized correlations shared with
smaller trading partners. In addition, the empirical evidence supports a significantly
negative relationship between realized correlations and realized FX rate volatilities
among CA and the US. Moreover, an increase in the volatility of FX reserves held by
the BoE leads to an uprise of UK and US breakeven correlations. Measures for global
(real) shocks and financial turbulence such as high yield corporate bond spreads, oil
price volatilities or stock market volatilities do moderately impact on observed corre-
lation features.
In summary, although under floating FX rates long run inflation expectations should
be determined solely by domestic monetary policy, international breakeven inflation
rates feature considerable dependence in both first and second order moments. These
findings have important monetary policy implications for small economies closely
linked to large trading partners. Firstly, the monetary authorities in the former have
to monitor inflation uncertainties in other dominant (global) economies to asses the
impact on the domestic inflation climate. Secondly, a decrease in FX rate flexibility
could imply that domestic inflation prospects are more sensitive to the foreign mone-
tary policy. The evidence in this study provides additional guidance for the conduct
of monetary policy, conditional on the relationship between FX rate volatility and
inflation uncertainty on the one hand and comovements of breakeven inflation on the
other hand. Under state dependence, the monetary authorities are naturally inter-
ested in a quantitative evaluation of first and second order transmission of expected
inflationary pressures from abroad.
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Concluding Remarks
In this work it is argued that the most basic decisions of monetary policy can be
motivated with regard to a few basic principles. For instance, the choice of a low in-
flation policy reflects the view that this helps to realize economic growth and stability
in the medium to long run. The decision for capital accounts openness is motivated
by presumed welfare gains from improved capital allocation. Lastly, exchange rate
flexibility is seen as a prerequisite for being able to pursue a domestic monetary policy
in presence of open capital markets.
Empirical studies on such assumptions, however, suffer from several conceptual
shortcomings that might give rise to biased conclusions. Namely, studies which inves-
tigate the interrelationship between inflation, inflation uncertainty, output and output
volatility might not provide representative evidence on typical interactions that might
prevail in modern world economies. Studies that address capital allocation efficiency
in terms of long run real interest rate convergence likely provide misleading results
due to the use of biased measures for long run real interest rates. Lastly, empirical ev-
idence on monetary autonomy suffers from overly stylized panel model specifications
and potentially misleading quantifications of nominal dependence.
The aim of this empirical work is to improve on these aspects. To provide an es-
timate on the general interrelationship among inflation, output and its uncertainties,
we aggregate information obtained from country specific VAR GARCH-M estimates
of inflation and output dynamics in 34 economies during the current era of low in-
flation policies. Inferring from the cross section of parameter estimates in the frame-
work of mean group estimation, we find that both inflation and inflation uncertainty
tend to exert a negative influence on economic growth for the majority of considered
economies. Hence, inflation and its uncertainty should be variables of concern for
monetary authorities.
To test for capital allocation efficiency, we investigate the convergence properties
of observable ex ante real interest rates obtained from Treasury Inflation Indexed
Securities. Both inference based on cointegration and unit root tests suggests long
run convergence of real capital market interest rates, and hence, the efficiency of
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capital allocation for the considered subset of G7 countries.
Turning to the question of monetary independence, we employ a flexible semi-
parametric panel methodology to express the tradeoff implied by the macroeconomic
trilemma in a general manner. Evidence suggests that economies with fixed FX rates
and closely integrated capital markets share one-to-one interest rate movements with
their reference economies. In contrast, states that are either characterized by higher
FX variation or lower capital mobility (or both) feature markedly less transmission.
Questioning the use of short run interest rates to measure monetary autonomy in
general, I provide an alternative empirical assessment of monetary dependence under
flexible exchange rates in terms of assessing comovements of international breakeven
inflation rates. Evidence suggests that international breakeven inflation rates feature
considerable dependence in both first and second order moments. Such comovements
are empirically traced back to global states of inflation uncertainty and exchange rate
(in)flexibility.
In summary, this work confirms the current view on the implications of monetary
stability, open capital accounts and exchange rate flexibility.
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